The intended conclusion of Descartes’ dream argument as contained in his first meditation is as follows: It is not possible for human beings to perfectly distinguish when they are awake from when they are dreaming. The premises leading up to the foregoing intended conclusion of Descartes’ dream argument as contained in Meditation One are that: firstly, humans when awake do have sense perceptions of a similar sort as are obtainable in dream states; and secondly, there is no fool-proof yardstick for differentiating between waking experiences and dream-state situations. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that humans may indeed be dreaming when they perceive themselves to be awake. Descartes states as follows in view of the foregoing: “As I consider these matters more carefully, I see so plainly that there are no definitive signs by which to distinguish being awake from being asleep.”
Descartes attempts to establish the above conclusion by the two premises previously stated, after showing how insane individuals’ fantastical waking experiences are in grain no different from the similarly fantastical experiential content of the dreams of sane people. He explains the aforementioned premises with illustrative examples so as to sufficiently support his points. He astutely guides his reader step by step along the argument toward his conclusion. Next, with regard to what kind of knowledge is supposed to survive Descartes’ argument, it would appear that Descartes is rejecting knowledge sourced via the senses, as he does in the argument preceding the dream one, where he states that “the senses do sometimes deceive us.” Knowledge obtained through reason alone, such as arithmetic or geometry, survives his dream argument, as opposed to knowledge obtained from physical sciences, such as “physics, astronomy, medicine, and all the other disciplines that are dependent upon the consideration of composite things.”
By way of evaluating Descartes’ argument so as to establish its success or lack thereof, I think that there is justification for Descartes’ argument. Our waking experiences do sometimes resemble our dream ones, and the images such as of animals, people, objects and so forth which we are confronted with in our dreams are often similar to those we encounter in situations when we are awake. Also, the emotions that dream experiences occasion in us correspond to the ones waking experiences engender in us; and we even carry over emotions deriving from dream experiences into waking situations. Hence, even though eminent philosopher Thomas Hobbes in this regard has contrarily stated thus: “upon waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied that being awake, I know I dream not; though when I dream, I think myself awake,” Descartes nonetheless makes a valid and convincing argument.
One objection that may be raised with regard to Descartes’ dream argument may be lucidity of perception, and Descartes in fact raises it himself. Descartes states thus: “But perhaps, even though the senses do sometimes deceive us when it is a question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters concerning which one simply cannot doubt, even though they are derived from the very same senses.” He goes further to illustrate the foregoing: “for example, that I am sitting here next to the fire, wearing my winter dressing gown, that I am holding this sheet of paper in my hands, and the like.” He shows in the subsequent lines of the text how doubting these lucid perceptions, perceptions close to his immediate range of vision as opposed to perceptions of distant objects that usually appear to be of a different size than they are when nearer to our immediate range of vision, would be apparently impossible. He also states: “But right now my eyes are certainly awake when I gaze upon this sheet of paper. This head which I am shaking is not heavy with sleep. I extend this hand consciously and deliberately, and I feel it. Such things would not be so distinct for someone who is asleep.” And so, it would appear that lucidity of perception presents a sure and definite way of distinguishing between dreaming and wakefulness.
Yet Descartes responds to this objection subsequently when he states as follows, with reference to the former illustration: “This would be all well and good, were I not a man who is accustomed to sleeping at night and to experiencing in my dreams the very same things or now and then even less plausible ones, as these insane people do when they are awake. How often (for example) does my evening slumber persuade me of such ordinary things as these: that I am here, clothed in my dressing gown, seated next to the fireplace – when in fact I am lying undressed in bed!” The reference to insane people here concerns his earlier position of supposedly being unable to deny perceptions of objects within his immediate range of vision, objects such as his very hands; his clothing and habitus (to borrow Aristotle’s terminology); his sitting beside the fire, and so on; proximate, lucid and tangible realities, as it were, save he were mad.
Descartes attempts to establish the above conclusion by the two premises previously stated, after showing how insane individuals’ fantastical waking experiences are in grain no different from the similarly fantastical experiential content of the dreams of sane people. He explains the aforementioned premises with illustrative examples so as to sufficiently support his points. He astutely guides his reader step by step along the argument toward his conclusion. Next, with regard to what kind of knowledge is supposed to survive Descartes’ argument, it would appear that Descartes is rejecting knowledge sourced via the senses, as he does in the argument preceding the dream one, where he states that “the senses do sometimes deceive us.” Knowledge obtained through reason alone, such as arithmetic or geometry, survives his dream argument, as opposed to knowledge obtained from physical sciences, such as “physics, astronomy, medicine, and all the other disciplines that are dependent upon the consideration of composite things.”
By way of evaluating Descartes’ argument so as to establish its success or lack thereof, I think that there is justification for Descartes’ argument. Our waking experiences do sometimes resemble our dream ones, and the images such as of animals, people, objects and so forth which we are confronted with in our dreams are often similar to those we encounter in situations when we are awake. Also, the emotions that dream experiences occasion in us correspond to the ones waking experiences engender in us; and we even carry over emotions deriving from dream experiences into waking situations. Hence, even though eminent philosopher Thomas Hobbes in this regard has contrarily stated thus: “upon waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied that being awake, I know I dream not; though when I dream, I think myself awake,” Descartes nonetheless makes a valid and convincing argument.
One objection that may be raised with regard to Descartes’ dream argument may be lucidity of perception, and Descartes in fact raises it himself. Descartes states thus: “But perhaps, even though the senses do sometimes deceive us when it is a question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters concerning which one simply cannot doubt, even though they are derived from the very same senses.” He goes further to illustrate the foregoing: “for example, that I am sitting here next to the fire, wearing my winter dressing gown, that I am holding this sheet of paper in my hands, and the like.” He shows in the subsequent lines of the text how doubting these lucid perceptions, perceptions close to his immediate range of vision as opposed to perceptions of distant objects that usually appear to be of a different size than they are when nearer to our immediate range of vision, would be apparently impossible. He also states: “But right now my eyes are certainly awake when I gaze upon this sheet of paper. This head which I am shaking is not heavy with sleep. I extend this hand consciously and deliberately, and I feel it. Such things would not be so distinct for someone who is asleep.” And so, it would appear that lucidity of perception presents a sure and definite way of distinguishing between dreaming and wakefulness.
Yet Descartes responds to this objection subsequently when he states as follows, with reference to the former illustration: “This would be all well and good, were I not a man who is accustomed to sleeping at night and to experiencing in my dreams the very same things or now and then even less plausible ones, as these insane people do when they are awake. How often (for example) does my evening slumber persuade me of such ordinary things as these: that I am here, clothed in my dressing gown, seated next to the fireplace – when in fact I am lying undressed in bed!” The reference to insane people here concerns his earlier position of supposedly being unable to deny perceptions of objects within his immediate range of vision, objects such as his very hands; his clothing and habitus (to borrow Aristotle’s terminology); his sitting beside the fire, and so on; proximate, lucid and tangible realities, as it were, save he were mad.
He states with reference to the foregoing: “Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to the insane, whose brains are impaired by such an unrelenting vapor of black bile that they steadfastly insist that they are kings when they are utter paupers, or that they are arrayed in purple robes when they are naked, or that they have heads made of clay, or that they are gourds, or that they are made of glass.” He also says, with specific reference to the latter illustration: “As if I did not recall having been deceived on other occasions by similar thoughts in my dreams.” And so it would appear that the lucidity of perception objection does not undermine Descartes’ dream argument after all.
Another objection is common to most people, and a number of individuals can testify to having had such experiences as I subsequently describe: It concerns the ability to feel emotions when a person is asleep and dreaming. The feeling of pain and other such tangible, unmistakably touching emotions, it would seem, distinguishes dreaming from wakefulness, as they are easily experienced in the latter. But there are some dreams that are so phenomenal that we do experience the feeling of pain while engaged in them, even though asleep. So, even this objection does not undermine the dream argument. Ultimately then, I think that Descartes makes a successful argument and, because I am persuaded of this, I can find no other “proper conclusion” to the dream argument.
Another objection is common to most people, and a number of individuals can testify to having had such experiences as I subsequently describe: It concerns the ability to feel emotions when a person is asleep and dreaming. The feeling of pain and other such tangible, unmistakably touching emotions, it would seem, distinguishes dreaming from wakefulness, as they are easily experienced in the latter. But there are some dreams that are so phenomenal that we do experience the feeling of pain while engaged in them, even though asleep. So, even this objection does not undermine the dream argument. Ultimately then, I think that Descartes makes a successful argument and, because I am persuaded of this, I can find no other “proper conclusion” to the dream argument.
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