Saturday, November 30, 2013

"And the Green Grass Grows all Around"

In a hole in the middle of the ground was the prettiest tree that you ever did see; and this tree had the prettiest parts ever. It is so the nursery song tells us. Jesus says that, when a mustard seed is planted, the small semen grows into a big shrub and gives shelter to the birds of the air. Our journey of small steps made by perennially putting one foot in front of another culminates in a lifetime, the making by intercourse of spirit and body of a soul. "We bless you father, Lord of life, to whom all living beings tend; the source of holiness and grace, our first beginning and our end." Hours give way to days, which in turn give way to weeks, and then to months, and years, and decades. Time keeps moving, bearing some of us along. Jesus said to the man he was calling to follow him: "Leave the dead to bury their dead. You, follow me." The goal of life and of salvation consists in the perpetual following of the master. "I will follow him, follow him wherever he may go, and near him I always will be for nothing can keep me away; he is my destiny. There isn't an ocean too deep or mountain so high it can keep me away from his love." Watch the movie, Sister Act, and appreciate these lyrics that talk about the awesomeness of our clinging tenaciously to God, the source of life itself. "We praise you O Lord, our God." "God is for us a refuge and strength, a helper close at hand in time of distress; so we shall not fear though the earth should rock; though the mountains tumble into the depths of the sea."
 
"The waters of a river give joy to God's city, the holy place where the most high dwells." "Even though its waters rage and foam; even though the mountains be shaken by its waves; the Lord of Hosts is with us; the God of Jacob is our stronghold." "Be still and know that I am God; supreme among the nations, supreme on the earth." The power and mercy of God are boundless. They surround us like a rampart, and afford protection the livelong day. We are blessed to be under the mantle of the divine lord. He protects us from a distance. "Lord do not come to my house, I'm unworthy; speak and the promise is sealed: for when your word O Lord is spoken, he shall be healed." It was so the centurion said when he accosted Jesus and begged the Lord to heal the centurion's servant. The love in the heart of the centurion, as it poured itself out in request to Jesus, moved the savior to act quickly. But the faith of the centurion was even more impressive. Jesus said concerning it: "Not in all of Israel have I found faith like this." "Increase our faith, Lord." "If your faith be as small as a mustard seed, you shall say to this mulberry shrub: 'be thou removed and cast into the sea,' and it will obey you." We do not care about drowning mulberry trees, Lord. But give us the faith to drown our sorrows and regrets; our hatreds and fears - give us the grace to follow you with clean hearts and pure thoughts, and without the negative emotions that we are burdened with.
 
Send us help from on high, Lord. Let us walk in your presence all the days of our lives. "Bless the work of our hands." "From his holy mountain, the lord will send his truth and his love." "We praise you, O Lord, our God." "Sing a new song to the Lord, his praise in the assembly of the faithful; let Israel rejoice in its maker; let Zion sons exult in their king; let them praise his name with dancing, and make music with timbrel and harp. For the Lord delights in his people; he crowns the poor with salvation; let the faithful rejoice in their glory, shout for joy and take their rest. And let the praise of God be on their lips." Indeed, "we praise you, O Lord, our God." And we praise you because your mercy lasts for ever. It is in you that "we live and move and have our being." Thank you God for all you do for us. Thank you for making us your children. We have faith in your saving power. We love you, and we desire to follow you more closely. We desire that, when we keep putting one foot in front of another, our journeying on will draw us nearer and nearer to you, and to no one else. May we never be distracted by the material trappings of this world. May we never be overwhelmed by the problems of this world. May we never lose faith because of the trials and temptations of this world. May we know, like Berkeley knows, that the world does not even exist to begin with. May we know that all there is is you, the eternal spirit; and may we know that it is in you that all things are and remain.
 
We love you, Lord. Do not forsake us. Let us always be your children. Keep us in your love forever. We want to cling to you without reservation. Bless us all the days of our lives. Help us to be closer to you always. Grant O lord that we may love you more, so that our knowledge and trust and consideration of you will extend to our brothers and sisters, and our friends. "Greater love hath no man than this: lay down his life for his friends." Give us many friends O Lord. "In those days, ten people from every nation will take [us] by the hand and say: 'I want to go with you, because I see that your God is with you.'" Let it be so for us. Let our faith inspire others. "Let our light so shine before people that they may see our good deeds and praise you Lord in heaven." We need you in our lives, Lord. We want you to heal us. Heal us from the pain we feel when we are suffering because of sin and evil in the world. Heal us from the sadness that threatens to choke and overwhelm us. Heal us from every unwelcome, negative emotion; from every situation that is not conducive to our progress along the road to you. Heal us from our shame for being human; from our guilt for not being perfect as you are, Lord. Heal us from selling ourselves short; for thinking unprofitable thoughts. Heal us from the backwardness of some of our ways, and the injury we do to others. Heal us from our lack of forgiveness, and from everything we do wrong, or forget to do at all. Heal us from life itself, and the scars we incur along the way. Heal, heal, heal, Lord; and bless us, as we keep making our way to you. Amen.

Friday, November 29, 2013

Vacation Bible School Reflection (Copy of a Reflection Written Over the Summer)

One of the beauties of being a seminarian is that you get sent to help out with summer vacation events. I've just returned from a 5-day bible school program organized by Our Lady of Perpetual Help Parish. It was fun. I taught elementary school kids bible stories, and led adults in prayer. However, the particularly sweet moments for me were not the passionate teaching sessions, or the few who came up to me after I had "performed" and thumped me saying, "Good job, Samuel!" The tenderest moments were for example when a little girl shouted after me as I was returning to the parish house: "Brother Samuel!" And when I turned around, she smiled and waved. A second example was when another little child, in all her innocence, threw herself at me, looked me in the eyes and smiled so divinely. I was joyful.

Only this evening, having led prayer and returned to my chair, a group of three girls said to my sweet surprise: "Come over and sit with us, Brother Samuel!" I smiled from ear to ear, and said: "Don't mind if I do." They chuckled. As I sat with them, they asked me a thousand and one questions, and not one of them included "Where are you from?" As far as they were concerned, I was one of them. My soul belonged to them. And please God, I would one day be a priest for them; for us, actually. There's no them, there's only us.

And so the bible school is over, and I'm lying on my bed and thinking of little Jazz-may who shouted after me as I made my way to the parish house. I'm thinking of Jules, who threw herself into my embrace after bible class; I'm thinking of the three school girls who invited me to sit with them, and I'm smiling. I'm feeling on top of the world, but in a good and humble way. I'm not as proud as the conceited rooster that we learnt of who always woke up very early in the morning, climbed on the fence and squealed: "Cluck-a-doodle-do," and then the sun would rise, and the farm animals would begin to graze, and the rooster would peer out and say to itself: "Ah, I make the morning come and the day begin!" And then one day the rooster overslept, and when it finally woke, the sun had already risen, and the farm animals had already begun to graze, and it was very sad, because its pride was hurt, and it went and hid in the corner of the yard, and its fellow birds scolded it and said: "You know, you never really caused the morning to start. All you did was herald it."

And so I know I am not indispensable in any way. Nothing I did at the Vacation Bible School was super special. I don't even remember the lessons I gave or the prayers I chanted. All I remember was that I felt a part of a community. I felt the unity that the heart craves. And the unity was a shower of grace for my heart, a pouring rain on the dry soil within. "Like the deer that yearns for running streams, so my soul is yearning for you my God" (Psalm 42:2). And I now know beyond a shadow of a doubt that these little acts of charity that chain out to many hearts - these are what I long for, thirst for. It is in them I see the face of God.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Mother Church's Mission to the Poor and Suffering

The Church’s teaching concerning its ministry to the poor and suffering members of its body in keeping with Christ’s own suffering and poverty while on earth draws from the rich Gospel and Ecclesial Traditions that lie at the core of Church history and progress. Jesus says in Luke 4:18: “The Spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to proclaim good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, and to set the oppressed free.” Repeatedly, the Gospels have drawn our attention to the poor, and encouraged us to see in them the person of Jesus. “Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?’ The king will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me’” (Matt. 25:37-40).

Even as far back as Old Testament times, charity toward the poor, and fellow feeling toward the suffering, have been hallmarks of true belief in God. Consistent with faith in a God who is father of all is an obligation of charity to everyone, regardless of demographic designation. The Book of Isaiah for example is replete with images of communal charity, eradication of suffering, and universal harmony. The Book of Amos in turn is abundant in appeals for social justice and fairness toward the poor. Even aspects of the Torah focus on the obligations the children of God owe to slaves, widows, foreigners, the poor, and the less privileged: responsibilities dealing with material welfare in addition to social justice. Indeed, nowhere is a demarcation made in all of scripture between faith in God and charity to the poor and suffering, whom God entrusts to our care.

Philippians 2:1-11 provides the model of Jesus who did not cling to his equality with the divine, but rather emptied himself and undertook a situation of servitude in order that he might become God’s instrument of salvation for all people. Reflecting on the theological implications of this self-giving of the son of God, at least three lessons are obtained: The first lesson is humility. Jesus chose to identify with humanity, even though he was God. Psalm 8:4 captures this amazing identification of the divine with humanity by exclaiming: “What is man that you keep him in mind; mortal man that you care for him!” The humility of Jesus is abundantly displayed in the Scriptures, including his service of feet-washing, performed for the benefit of his disciples at the last supper (John 13:1-17).

Another lesson to be drawn from a theological reflection on Jesus’ self-sacrifice for humanity is the redemptive power of human suffering. The cross of Jesus, which ordinarily was a symbol of shame in Ancient Rome, has become for us the pride of our redemption. It is by the wood of the cross that Christ has brought salvation to all people. And so, rather than debasement, we are brought glorification. The suffering and struggle on the way to Calvary, and the eventual crucifixion and death of Christ, are our highest points of glory, as members of Christ’s body. Jesus says in John 12:32: “And if I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw all people to myself.” This ultimate manifestation of glory in the passion and death of Christ in the Synoptic Gospels leads the Centurion to exclaim: “Surely, this man was the son of God” (Mt. 27:54; Mk. 15:39; Lk. 23:47). The entelechy of Christ (to borrow Aristotle’s nomenclature for second order reality, which is the highest experience of formal reality) was indeed the cross, and for us members of his body, our identification with the suffering and the poor should be for us our highest point of glory as children of God, and brothers of Christ.

The third lesson is a renewed appreciation for the Church as servant. This is one of the models presented by Catholic theologian Avery Dulles in his task at providing a paradigmatic understanding of the Catholic Church’s missionary role in the world. Integral with other models, such as institution, mystical communion, sacrament and herald, Holy Mother Church as a servant of the children of God is obligated to care for the poor and suffering members of society. Although we already do much to help the poor and suffering through our many charitable institutions, especially Catholic Charities here in our land, we all know that we can do more. The number of people that need help from Mother Church keeps growing, and opportunities for reaching out to the less privileged abound. Catholic ministers need to step up their efforts in this regard. We must recall that “work is great, but the laborers are few” (Matt. 9:37; Lk. 10:2).

The Church’s presence in the world in view of her mission as Christ’s body, charged with the responsibility of identifying with the Savior’s own suffering and poverty as visible in the lives of the many people currently poor and suffering, is crucial in bringing healing and relief to these underprivileged individuals. Catholic Charities; St. Vincent De Paul Societies; Parish Food Pantry Services; Caritas Organizations, and the many other church-based groups that reach out to the needy and deprived members of our human community still need our help. On individual bases, we as Christians, children of God the father of all, must step out and lend a hand. Whether by volunteering at soup kitchens, shelters, humane societies, upward-bound programs or any other groups involved in the lives of the less fortunate, we must always strive to answer the call to identify with Jesus’ suffering and poverty as visible in others. We must recall that, as long as we are present to these persons that need our help, we are assuredly fulfilling a divine mission.

Wednesday, November 27, 2013

An Informal Summary Look at a few Problems of Philosophy

One of the problems of philosophy is evil. The problem of evil may be stated thus: If the world was created by a God that is good, why is there so much evil in it? Is it that the creator, even though good, is powerless to stop evil? But God is possessed of every perfection there is, including power. So we cannot admit that he is powerless. Then, is it that, even though powerful enough to stop evil, he is not good enough to do so? But we've already established that he is good. And so we cannot admit that he is anything but good. This remains a problem in philosophy. Some scholars have tried to solve this problem by inserting the variable of free will. They say that the presence of evil in the world has nothing to do with God, but only with human beings, who have free will. Therefore, the existence of evil in the world is as a result of the fact that God gave humans free will to do what they please, and humans are not perfect like God is, and so they sometimes do evil. Ergo, the presence of evil. This seems like a good enough explanation for the problem of evil in the world, and yet scholars are not unanimously agreed on it. The whole field of moral philosophy (ethics) perennially wrestles with this problem because, founded on this one problem, is the whole world of responsibility for human behavior and deservedness of possible punishment for wrongdoing. Spinoza for example would explain this issue in a much different way than Berkeley would.
 
Another problem of philosophy is mind-body interaction. This is a major problem for idealists and dualists. Can we say this problem started with Plato? I'm not sure. Plato was one of the first people that said that we are a duality of spirit and body. Unlike Aristotle and his hylomorphism or soul and body composites, Plato was of the view that the spirit lay in the prison of the body, and is freed after death. [By the way, my own philosophy of spirit, soul and body reconciles Plato's and Aristotle's views.] For Plato, the material world is a shadow one; it is not real. The real world for him is that of forms, and the things in this world exist only by participation in that transcendent world of forms. Descartes took this dualism paradigm a step further. He was of the view that there are two separate realities: the thinking thing (or mind; what Plato would call spirit or soul), and the extended thing (body). These things are separate for Descartes, and we human beings are thinking things. We simply inhabit bodies. But the problem with this epistemological view is this: how does the thinking thing (mind, soul, spirit, as the case may be) interact with the extended thing (body)? For example, how is it that I can move my hand by simply willing it to move? Why is there no understanding as to the processes involved in such a simple, spontaneous activity? The operations of the central nervous system do not answer the problem, because the brain and the spinal cord are part of the extended thing. The thinking thing is outside the body, as we know it. [This is why brain death is not necessarily the death of the human being, and so forth.] No one has as yet solved this problem: not Berkeley, not Descartes, not Leibniz, and not Kant. How does the body interact with the spirit?
 
Let me take this problem a bit further. Recall that, unlike Berkeley, Descartes and even Aquinas, I propose that the words "soul" and "spirit" are completely different. The aforementioned philosophers use the words interchangeably. I say: STOP. They are different. In my post-contemporary metaphysics, I say: there is a way by which to reconcile Aristotle with Plato. Aristotle says that the body and the soul are an inseparable composite. I say YES. This is because, at death, when the body lets go of the spirit (not the soul, but the spirit), the soul that has been formed in the lifetime just ended is an entity in itself, and it can only be thought of, and judged by God, in terms of the body; in terms of the temporal and material circumstances in which it lived. When people remember that soul, they do so in terms of the food the soul ate; the country the soul lived in; the parents, friends, siblings and associates the soul interacted with. And so yes, Aristotle is correct when he says that the body and the soul are an inseparable composite. But Plato is also right when he says that the spirit (not the soul, but the spirit) is caged in the body, and is set free after death. It is. That spirit belongs to God.
 
We do not create the spirit, even though in a sense we create the soul, because of the behavioral and other choices we make in a lifetime. [But we do not completely create the soul, because the masculine or spiritual principle of the soul is the spirit, and we do not create that. And that is why sometimes we wonder why we can do nothing about falling in love with someone, or why certain fields of study appeal to us more than others do: why we feel for example as if we would like to study math, but our natural inclinations push us to study literature and language, and so forth.] Aristotle and Plato are both right: the soul and the body are inseparable composites because even after death a soul is necessarily remembered in terms of its body (material circumstances); for even Aquinas would include matter (body) in his definition of the human essence (where Aristotle would not). We think of dead people in terms of their bodies; what they were to us; how they treated us, and so forth. But the spirit that interacted with the body to make the soul does leave the body upon death. And so, Plato is also correct. Both of them are right, but only if we do not use the terms "spirit" and "soul" as if they were synonyms. They aren't. Philosophers over the years have been doing so. They have been using these terms as synonyms. I say to them: STOP. Just stop. Okay? Stop. Spirit is different from soul. I mean, one can use the words: mind, person, personality and so forth interchangeably with soul; but never with spirit. We do not create spirit. God is spirit. He gives us a portion of his spirit for a purpose. Please, if you like, read again my blog post entitled: "What is Spirit, What is Soul, and What is Body?" But notice that my distinction between soul and spirit does not solve the problem of how body interacts with spirit, or even soul. I still am at a loss as to the solution of this philosophical problem.
 
Yet another problem of philosophy is suicide. This is a problem for existentialists. Existentialists believe that existence precedes essence. [Here, don't think of Anselm or Aquinas, as such.] For existentialists, there is no teleology; no purpose for human life. A person is born, surges up in the world, and makes out his or her own essence. Let me explain further. Okay. Think of a chair. Before it was fashioned, its essence existed in the mind of the carpenter. In the same way, some scholars - not existentialists - believe that the essence of the human being existed in the mind of God before the human was born (Recall in this regard that God said concerning Jeremiah: "From the womb before the birth I knew you.") If this be the case, God had a purpose for that human life, a purpose he knew even before that human was born. And so, for these philosophers, there is a teleology to human life. But for existentialists - many of whom by the way do not believe in God - there is no essence of human being existing in the mind of God. A human being is simply randomly born and, having attained the age of reason, begins to fashion a goal for himself. He becomes the center of his own universe; the human becomes the yardstick for measuring moral behavior. In short, the human is God unto himself or herself. All well and good. Forget the fact that we can't always succeed at what we choose; forget the fact that some choices end up harder to pull off than others, because of our natural talents and predispositions; and the presence of a hierarchy to life. There remains the problem of suicide. If we are God to ourselves, and we chart our own life, and have a responsibility to be the yardstick of morality, how can we then at any point choose to kill ourselves? And so, the problem of suicide is real for existentialists.
 
One more problem for epistemology is that of appearance versus reality. This was a problem for Descartes. In his first meditation, he was puzzled as to what could be real. He realized that the experiences we sometimes have in dreams resemble those we have in real life. He also realized that a house could look smaller when viewed from a distance. We all know about mirages, dejavus, illusions, and so forth. How can we differentiate between appearance and reality? Plato simply urged us to call this world the one of appearance, and the world of forms, reality. Berkeley would have us deny the existence of material objects, except as ideas or sensations in the mind. Aristotle would have us differentiate between substance and accident; Kant would have us demarcate noumena from phenomena. Heidegger would direct our attention to "the things themselves," and so forth. Yet the problem of appearance versus reality endures. Descartes in trying to solve this enduring problem insists on rejecting the knowledge sourced via the senses, and accepting only arithmetic. Aquinas proposes degrees of perfections of things. Plato separates knowledge from ignorance and opinion, and in his divided line paradigm, advances a hierarchy of certitude from sensation to cogitation, a situation described in his Theatetus as the state wherein the soul by itself, in itself and through itself reaches truth. Newman would call us to realize there is a distinction between inference and assent, and certitude or secondary assent is knowledge. St Augustine would call this state a connection with the inner teacher. Plotinus would call it a connection with the One. Avicenna would call it a state where the agent intellect aligns perfectly with individual potential intellect. All these aforementioned philosophers agree that there is a difference between appearance (what is not, for Parmenides) and reality (what is). But how can we always know what is; how can we always be sure about truth? This remains a problem for epistemology.

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

A Summary Gander at Heideggerian Poetic Philosophy

If you live long enough, at some point you'll come to discover that you already knew many things even before you knew that you knew them. One of such things is that life is difficult. We all know that. We all think that; we all expect that. But perhaps not so nearly as much as we were accustomed to believing when we first thought it. That the storms will give way in our lives, and that there will come a more fashioned way of doing business for all of us - these are the certain triumphs of existence. We do not need awesome philosophy for all of this. We do not even need science. What we need is sociological imagination, as sociologists have told us. We need to be able to place ourselves at the center of being, like Heidegger does, and see if we can forge a poetry of life. After all, everything for him starts with poetry. We need to brace forth and capture the past, the present and the future in one neat embrace, and see if we can forge some logical coherence from all of them - see if we can get our fifteen minutes of fame by playing God. How cool is that!
 
Poetry is not the only thing that starts us out on the philosophical journey to the end. By the way, who was it that said that philosophy is an exercise in masochism, because we keep searching even when we know we will never find truth? It's like going round and round in circles or playing musical chairs - just at that moment when the music stops and we desperately seek a chair, we find it removed from under our butt. Sad. Classic disappointment seems to await those that seek fervently for what they cannot have. Yet they go on seeking. We all go on seeking as if that's all we really can do. Wait a minute - it's all we can really do. Anyway. The poetry that begins our metaphysical exploration of what is lurches forth into the dark recesses of the unknown and first presents us with the seeming that is born in strife. This seeming is either a semblance or a reality, according to Heidegger. If it endures and stays true to its nature, to the phusis, then it is becoming. Otherwise it is deceit.
 
Metaphysics for Heidegger is true philosophy. It is a return to the things themselves, to greatness that begins the great enterprise of German destiny - all great destiny: all it is that deserves to exist, to justify why there is being instead of nothing. In this grand Daseinic revelation, we cannot not step into the same river twice - but even if we aren't Christians, and even if the waters of Heraclitus have been muddied by Poseidon in an eternal quarrel with Athena's human lover, we are all poised to speak our minds and to form a concept of the trail that leads us to the gates of Hermes, or worse still, Troy. Are we telling the truth; can Odysseus be brought to do the same? And what will that truth be? Not even Pilate knew. And are we going to ask like him what that truth is? What is truth? Is it that thing, that set of words, that makes listeners go "Ah!"? Because if one should tell me otherwise, such a person would let loose a torrent of questioning. The whys and hows and whiches and whats would amaze in their number; but who would guarantee that they would not simply lead to more such questionings, in a grand geometric assemblage of potential refutations and speeches?
 
The start of life is poetry. Poetry is not science. It is ontological and interpretive, and it is originary. It is artistic, and it is great. It tries to explain why there is being instead of nothing. The grand philosophical question that has eluded human grasp for centuries is finally taken up by poetry. Poetry questions in a uniquely different way than science. It stops short only at the gates of Hades, whereas science never even ventures to leave the physical world. Why is there being instead of nothing? It is a question that troubles Heidegger. It is a poetic question. Define nothing. Define being. Define the source of questioning. Why is there anything? What would Hegel say? What would be the synthesis that results from the dialog between being and nothing? Seeming? Becoming? Or just the grand strife and the glorious struggle that animate and define life? What would John the Evangelist say? What would Mary of Magdala for that matter say? There would be many conjectures, but we would never know the truth. Such questions would ever be beyond the reach of probable science.
 
Why then is there being instead of nothing? The originary, poetic underpinning of existence a la Heidegger is a poetic explication of contemporary understanding of metaphysics. There is no way to escape the question, which poetry naturally takes upon itself in its bid to afford teleology to the strife that clouds the human experience. The greatness that starts out great inspires, exhorts, challenges, and we may or may not rise to it. If we do, then we take bold strides into a future marked with human progress that is not scientific. If we do not, we may be bogged down by mass production, and economy-driven sophistications that do not lead to real growth of the human spirit. We would by that token trade the soul for the trappings of materialism, and fall again into the quagmire that Berkeley sought so ardently to unshackle us from. We would be redefining humanity in a negative way and in the process undermining our own existence.
 
Is there hope? What would Heidegger say?

Monday, November 25, 2013

A Reorganized Summary Version of George Berkeley's Arguments Against Material Substances and in Favor of Spirits, Part 2

In Berkeley's own words: “Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds of entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the same, to wit, spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting and dependent beings.” Concerning how Berkeley argues that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter, although we have ideas of neither,” Berkeley further states: “We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we do not have ideas.” He also states: “To me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse.” [Take note of the words “knowledge” and “discourse.”]

If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.”

He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, beings which perceive, and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”

He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent of differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea, Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. The subsequent portion of this paper will concern itself with how we can have ideas of neither spirits nor matter, as per paper requirements.

According to Collins: “In one sense, then, the mind is unknowable: it cannot be known through ideas.” In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind, which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.”

Further in the paragraph, Berkeley offers a challenge in this regard to anyone who can have ideas of the powers of will and understanding, or of substance or being in general. These spiritual realities in Berkeley's view cannot “be represented by any idea whatsoever.” For Berkeley, only notions can be had of minds, or souls or spirits, and their operations, such as willing, or loving, or hating or the like. According to Collins, the only strictly immediate knowledge is the perceptual content of one's own mind. Collins goes further to state in this regard: “Berkeley tries his best to avoid the solipsistic implications of this description of the cognitive situation. He bases his escape from solipsism mainly upon the demonstration of God's existence which is both intelligible to the average man and yet strictly demonstrative.” Collins further states: “Perceiving is an operation of the mind, but what we perceive lies beyond our control. Some other active principle must be invoked in order to account for the actual presentation of sensory contents to our mind, since we cannot voluntarily determine its content. Now, the sole source of the ideas cannot come from material substance, the existence of which has been disproved.” Collins pursues the discourse further by showing how sensible things cannot be responsible for ideas in the mind, since they “partake of the inert, casually inefficacious character of all ideas”; and so the active source of all ideas of sense for Berkeley is “some spiritual substance.” For Berkeley, this spiritual substance is not finite, since it should be able to convey to the finite mind the entire natural order. This spiritual substance would rather be infinite.

Berkeley’s argument in my estimation in successful. For Berkeley, there are only two things: passive ideas of sense, and active spirits, who do the perceiving. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “In addition to perceived things (ideas), Berkeley posits perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them.” Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive.” So, reality is either that which perceives (mind, spirit, soul), or that which is perceived, and nothing else. We do not know material substances very simply because they do not exist. They are ideas contained in the mind. And we do not know spirits because they are beyond the finite capacity of ideas in the mind. God, the infinite mind or spirit, however knows everything, and communicates to the individual mind notions of spirits and the activity of spirits (perceiving), in such a fashion that knowledge of reality ultimately depends on God's existence. As an exercise in idealism, it is a coherent and plausible argument. It may not necessarily appeal to common-sense, as we ordinarily think of common-sense. But recall that earlier in this paper, it was shown that Berkeley saw his view to be better in keeping with the dictates of common-sense than the materialist (and “impious”) views of empiricists such as Locke and Newton.

Sunday, November 24, 2013

A Reorganized Summary Version of Berkeley's Arguments Againt Material Substances and in Favor of Spirits, Part 1

The qualities ascribed to matter by philosophers such as Locke, Newton and Descartes include: extension, solidity, motion, number, figure; as well as color, taste, smell and sound. The previous five are primary qualities, while the latter four are secondary qualities. According to Collins, a crucial starting point in Berkeley's task of undermining the existence of material substances was to “show that there is no essential epistemological difference between primary and secondary qualities.” In other words, even the so-called primary qualities of matter must be seen to be just as mind-dependent as the secondary qualities. Berkeley does this in two ways: firstly, he shows that no material object may be conceived of as having only primary qualities and, as such, primary qualities are inseparable from secondary ones and, if this be the case, they must exist in the same place as secondary qualities do, the mind. Berkeley states thus: “For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.” Secondly, Berkeley demonstrates that, similar to secondary qualities, primary qualities may appear to be different depending on the perceiver. Berkeley clearly is trying to argue in categorical terms for the necessary dependence on human perception (mental process) of material substances.

Berkeley is of the view that material things are things perceived by the mind and not self-existing substances. He states in this regard concerning material things: “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.” He is also of the view that we perceive nothing other than our own ideas and sensations. He states as follows in this regard: “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow.” For Berkeley, furthermore, it is repugnant that any of our ideas or sensations or a combination of them should exist unperceived. He states in this regard as follows: “And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?” Berkeley further states thus: “In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.” Broad also states concerning Berkeley’s view: “Is it not self-contradictory to suppose that there might be unsensed sensibilia?”

In other words, if material substances are only sensibilia (things that must be sensed in order to exist), they cannot then be properly said to exist when they are not being sensed. In this regard, Berkeley states: “The table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed – meaning by that that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does actually perceive it. There was an odor; that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. That is all I can understand by these and the like expressions.” Berkeley further states: “It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind. To me it is evident that those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all.” He further states in the same paragraph in which the aforementioned words are contained: “It is on this therefore that I insist namely, that 'the absolute existence of unthinking things' are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction.”

Furthermore, according to Berkeley, “even if there were such a thing as matter, we could never know it, and all the things we take to be evidence for its existence could exist without it, and can be better explained without recourse to matter.” Also, where Locke would affirm that “matter is the best and simplest explanation for our sensations,” Berkeley would argue that “matter can offer no explanation at all of our sensations in the absence of an explanation of how matter can act on the mind.” Recall in any case that this was an indefatigable problem for Descartes' dualism, and it remains unresolved presently. With regard to number as well – recall Descartes' value for arithmetic truths – Berkeley further states: “That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities are allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects.”
 
Berkeley ultimately argues then that: “All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive – there is nothing of power or agency included in them.” Collins would state in this regard: “If matter does not vanish in a cloud of empty words, it is the locus of a flagrant set of contradictions. Material substance is (for Berkeley) inert.” In other words, it is nothingness. It is non-existent. Hence, Berkeley reiterates his claim that material substances have no reality in themselves. The subsequent will inquire into whether he makes a successful argument. In this regard, Collins states: “The success of Berkeley's argument depends upon the soundness of the commonly held seventeenth-century thesis concerning the subjectivity of the secondary qualities. The Galilean doctrine on secondary and primary qualities was methodologically useful for securing the mathematical interpretation of the material world, but the progressive empiricist criticism revealed its inadequacy as a general philosophical tool. After Berkeley's critique, the problem of secondary and primary qualities became a peripheral one, since non-mathematical principles of interpretation came to the fore.”

Furthermore, Collins states: “Berkeley sacrifices matter and yet retains the more basic Lockean conception of the philosophical method and its object, the idea.” In other words, he reduces the problem concerning matter to “a problem concerning perception.” “Hence Berkeley proves, not that the idea is the only sensible existent, but that a starting point in the analysis of ideas can tell nothing about the act of existing exercised by material things.” Also, the aforementioned equation of secondary and primary qualities underpins the categorical subjectivity of material substances and firmly fixes them as mind-dependent. Based on these reasons, I assert that Berkeley makes a successful argument against materialism, here defined as “the view that mind-independent material objects exist.”

Saturday, November 23, 2013

George Berkeley Argues in Favor of Spirits, Part 2

Further in the paragraph, Berkeley offers a challenge in this regard to anyone who can have ideas of the powers of will and understanding, or of substance or being in general. These spiritual realities in Berkeley's view cannot “be represented by any idea whatsoever.” For Berkeley, only notions can be had of minds, or souls or spirits, and their operations, such as willing, or loving, or hating or the like. Recall in any case that this is similar to Locke's view concerning our inability to know the substratum which holds the qualities of material substances together. The distinction in this regard is that we do not know material substances because they do not exist to begin with, and we do not know minds or spirits because they exist beyond the realm of ideas, even though they do exist independently.

According to Collins, the only strictly immediate knowledge is the perceptual content of one's own mind. Collins goes further to state in this regard: “Berkeley tries his best to avoid the solipsistic implications of this description of the cognitive situation. He bases his escape from solipsism mainly upon the demonstration of God's existence which is both intelligible to the average man and yet strictly demonstrative.” Collins further states: “Perceiving is an operation of the mind, but what we perceive lies beyond our control. Some other active principle must be invoked in order to account for the actual presentation of sensory contents to our mind, since we cannot voluntarily determine its content. Now, the sole source of the ideas cannot come from material substance, the existence of which has been disproved.” Collins pursues the discourse further by showing how sensible things cannot be responsible for ideas in the mind, since they “partake of the inert, casually inefficacious character of all ideas”; and so the active source of all ideas of sense for Berkeley is “some spiritual substance.” For Berkeley, this spiritual substance is not finite, since it should be able to convey to the finite mind the entire natural order. This spiritual substance would rather be infinite, and the ideas of sense contained in such an infinite mind would be communicated willingly and intelligently. God, for Berkeley, is this infinite mind, and is the first principle of cogitation. Collins states in this regard: “Berkeley relies implicitly upon the existence of God, as an infinite and actual perceiver, in order to secure the identification between esse and percipi.

Having explored the Berkeley's argument in favor of spirits in the foregoing, it is pertinent to evaluate the argument so as to determine if it is successful or not. The argument in my estimation in successful. For Berkeley, there are only two things: passive ideas of sense (where the objects of sense themselves do not exist independently of the mind), and active spirits, who do the perceiving. So, reality is either that which perceives (mind, spirit, soul), or that which is perceived, and nothing else. We do not know material substances very simply because they do not exist. They are ideas contained in the mind. And we do not know spirits because they are beyond the finite capacity of ideas in the mind. God, the infinite mind or spirit, however knows everything, and communicates to the individual mind notions of spirits and the activity of spirits (perceiving), in such a fashion that knowledge of reality ultimately depends on God's existence. As an exercise in idealism, it is a coherent and plausible argument. It may not necessarily appeal to common-sense, as we ordinarily think of common-sense. But recall that earlier in this paper, it was shown that Berkeley saw his view to be better in keeping with the dictates of common-sense than the materialist (and “impious”) views of empiricists such as Locke and Newton.

Friday, November 22, 2013

George Berkeley Argues in Favor of Spirits, Part 1

In Berkeley's own words: “Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds of entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the same, to wit, spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting and dependent beings.” Concerning how Berkeley argues that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter, although we have ideas of neither,” Berkeley further states: “We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we do not have ideas.” He also states: “To me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse.” [Take not of the words “knowledge” and “discourse.”]

If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.” He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, being which perceive, and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.” 

He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent of differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea, Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.”

An internal summary is here apt. Having explored the earlier argument of Berkeley's against the existence of mind-independent material substances, the paper has embarked on a critique of Berkeley's argument in favor of the existence of active substances called spirits, or minds, or souls. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “In addition to perceived things (ideas), Berkeley posits perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them. Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive. This suggests that Berkeley has replaced one kind of dualism, of mind and matter, with another kind of dualism, of mind and idea.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. The subsequent portion of this paper will concern itself with how we can have ideas of neither spirits nor matter, as per paper requirements.

According to Collins: “In one sense, then, the mind is unknowable: it cannot be known through ideas.” [“This forces Berkeley to posit a new means of knowledge, especially different from the idea. This is his fundamental distinction between idea and notion.”] In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind, which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.” 

Thursday, November 21, 2013

George Berkeley Denies the Existence of Material Substances, Part 2

An internal summary is here apt. It has been shown that a concern for the preservation and propagation of religion drove Berkeley to launch an attack on the philosophical underpinnings of irreligion, viz materialism. In this regard, “Berkeley thinks that the supposition of (the existence of) matter causes more problems for humanity than it solves. It allows skepticism to creep in by allowing one to make a distinction between the world as it really is and the world as it appears (when there is no such distinction for Berkeley), and it prompts impiety, not least because its defenders are in effect arguing that 'God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless and serve no manner of purpose,' because one can get all the sensations without needing matter.” It has also been shown that Berkeley denied there being a difference between primary and secondary qualities of material substances, and this denial further undermined the existence of mind-independent material substances. It has further been shown that Berkeley's arguments against materialism may be divided into three groups: firstly, direct arguments for his view; secondly, attacks on certain alternative views, and thirdly, discussion of certain possible objections to his view. So far, direct arguments in support for Berkeley's view have been proffered. Also, attacks on alternative views, notably those of Locke and Descartes, have been provided. The next portion of this essay will afford discussion on certain possible objections to Berkeley's position with regard to material substances and show how Berkeley counters these objections, and how in so doing he paves the way for the furtherance of his immaterialism.

To begin with, Hume objects to Berkeley's immaterialism by stating that “if the existence of ideas is one with their being perceived, then (at least, for all we can know) the sensible world ceases to exist whenever the acts of perception themselves cease. This would lead to the doctrine of intermittent existence and a consequent denial of the permanence of sense things.” This criticism “forced Berkeley to appeal to the distinction between God's mind and our own.” This distinction allowed Berkeley to aver that “sensible things depend on the mind of God, which always wills and perceives them. In other words, even when Berkeley is not perceiving the desk in his office when he steps out of the room, he assumes it remains there in his office because God is perceiving it. This in a sense is a proof of the existence of God a la Berkeley.

Another objection is that Berkeley's immaterialism “destroys the objective world,” by reducing otherwise concrete things to “subjective states and then to sheer illusion.” This charge of illusionism is counteracted by Berkeley who is of the view that it is in fact his philosophical position that reinforces the common-sense view of the world. Broad has stated in this regard: “[Berkeley] always maintains that he is denying only the theories of certain scientists and philosophers, such as the Newtonians, Descartes and Locke. He asserts that his own view admits the existence of all that plain men understand by 'bodies' or 'material things." Berkeley goes further to insist on this common-sense paradigm of immaterialism when he states: “When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to anyone the truth and evidence of what is said here and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.”

Yet another objection to Berkeley's argument, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is that “the argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and un-thought of. Why not? Simply because in order to conceive of any such things, we must ourselves be conceiving, i.e., thinking, of them. However, such an argument seems to conflate the representation (what we conceive with) and the represented (what we conceive of – the content of our thought). Once we make this distinction, we realize that although we must have some conception or representation in order to conceive of something, and that representation is in some sense thought of, it does not follow (contra Berkeley) that what we conceive of must be a thought-of object. That is, when we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we (arguably) conceive of an unthought-of object, though of course we must employ a thought in order to accomplish this feat. Thus (as many commentators have observed), this argument fails.” Berkeley's argument does not necessarily fall apart for this. Berkeley would state in this regard that the “representation” here spoken of is one and the same with the “represented,” since the represented does not exist in itself, but is summarily reduced to the representation, as an idea that, passive as it is, cannot exist except in the activity of a mind, or soul or spirit. 

Berkeley ultimately argues then that: “All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive – there is nothing of power or agency included in them.” Collins would state in this regard: “If matter does not vanish in a cloud of empty words, it is the locus of a flagrant set of contradictions. Material substance is (for Berkeley) inert.” In other words, it is nothingness. It is non-existent. Hence, Berkeley reiterates his claim that material substances have no reality in themselves. The subsequent will inquire into whether he makes a successful argument. In this regard, Collins states: “The success of Berkeley's argument depends upon the soundness of the commonly held seventeenth-century thesis concerning the subjectivity of the secondary qualities. The Galilean doctrine on secondary and primary qualities was methodologically useful for securing the mathematical interpretation of the material world, but the progressive empiricist criticism revealed its inadequacy as a general philosophical tool. After Berkeley's critique, the problem of secondary and primary qualities became a peripheral one, since non-mathematical principles of interpretation came to the fore.”
 
Furthermore, Collins states: “Largely for the sake of securing an advantage over skepticism, atheism, and irreligious materialism, Berkeley sacrifices matter and yet retains the more basic Lockean conception of the philosophical method and its object, the idea.” In other words, he reduces the problem concerning matter to “a problem concerning perception.” “Hence Berkeley proves, not that the idea is the only sensible existent, but that a starting point in the analysis of ideas can tell nothing about the act of existing exercised by material things.” Also, the aforementioned equation of secondary and primary qualities underpins the categorical subjectivity of material substances and firmly fixes them as mind-dependent. Based on these reasons, I assert that Berkeley makes a successful argument against materialism, here defined as “the view that mind-independent material objects exist.”

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

George Berkeley Denies the Existence of Material Substances, Part 1

Berkeley's concern for what he described as a declining state of reverence for the spiritual underpinned his radical philosophy of immaterialism. Berkeley himself states in this regard: “Were it necessary to add any further proof against the existence of matter, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of greater moment in religion.” Broad is of the view that, in denying the existence of material substances, Berkeley was denying the theories of scientists and philosophers like Newton, Locke and Descartes. In Berkeley's own words, his treatise was to foray into “the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of skepticism, atheism and irreligion.” Berkeley believed that the rejection of matter would put paid to the encroaching doubt of the religious. In other words, if the grounds for atheism are that material things exist without support from God, and Berkeley could show that material things did not even exist to begin with, the entire philosophical edifice of materialism would be crushed, paving the way for a revitalization of religious thought.

The qualities ascribed to matter by philosophers such as Locke, Newton and Descartes include: extension, solidity, motion, number, figure; as well as color, taste, smell and sound. The previous five are primary qualities, while the latter four are secondary qualities. According to Collins, a crucial starting point in Berkeley's task of undermining the existence of material substances was to “show that there is no essential epistemological difference between primary and secondary qualities.” In other words, even the so-called primary qualities of matter must be seen to be just as mind-dependent as the secondary qualities. Berkeley does this in two ways: firstly, he shows that no material object may be conceived of as having only primary qualities and, as such, primary qualities are inseparable from secondary ones and, if this be the case, they must exist in the same place as secondary qualities do, the mind. Berkeley states thus: “For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.” Secondly, Berkeley demonstrates that, similar to secondary qualities, primary qualities may appear to be different depending on the perceiver. Berkeley clearly is trying to argue categorically for the dependence on human perception of material substances.

According to Broad, Berkeley's arguments against materialism may be divided into three groups: firstly, direct arguments for his view; secondly, attacks on certain alternative views, and thirdly, discussion of certain possible objections to his view. To begin with, Berkeley is of the view that material things are things perceived by the mind and not self-existing substances [Berkeley himself states in this regard concerning material things: “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”] He is also of the view that we perceive nothing other than our own ideas and sensations [Berkeley himself states as follows in this regard: “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow.”] And thirdly that it is repugnant that any of our ideas or sensations or a combination of them should exist unperceived [Berkeley states in this regard as follows: “And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?”] In other words, with regard to the first item of Berkeley's view, the houses, mountains and so forth which we perceive do not have actual existence in themselves, but only perceptual existence (in the mind). In other words, not even the primary qualities attributable to them justify their existence separate from the mind.
 
Concerning the second item of Berkeley's view, it would appear that all we can perceive are our sensations. We have no certain epistemological relationship between what we perceive in our mind and any corresponding reality outside the mind. Berkeley himself states thus: “In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.” And with regard to the third item of Berkeley's view, Broad puts it succinctly when he states: “Is it not self-contradictory to suppose that there might be unsensed sensibilia?” In other words, if material substances are only sensibilia (things that must be sensed in order to exist), they cannot then be properly said to exist when they are not being sensed. In this regard, Berkeley states: “The table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed – meaning by that that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does actually perceive it. There was an odor; that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. That is all I can understand by these and the like expressions.” Berkeley further states: “It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind. To me it is evident that those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all.” He further states in the same paragraph in which the aforementioned words are contained: “It is on this therefore that I insist namely, that 'the absolute existence of unthinking things' are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction.”

By way of attacks on alternative views to his immaterialism, Berkeley attempts to show how absurd it is to admit of mind-independent existence of material substances. To begin with, it has already been established how Berkeley refuted Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities of material substances, and how such refutation categorically placed material things squarely in the set of sensibilia. Berkeley in any case further disputes with Locke concerning the latter's view on “substances,” which he defined as the substratum, or support, for the qualities of material things. For Berkeley, this so-called substratum should properly be called mind (or spirit), since it has already been shown that the qualities Locke speaks about are ideas for Berkeley, and ideas exist only in the mind. In other words, rather than a substratum holding in place qualities, we should properly speak of a mind or spirit holding in place ideas. [Berkeley discusses the foregoing in his Treatise, Part 1 § 16-18, where he uses the word substratum interchangeably with “support.”]
 
Furthermore, according to Berkeley, “even if there were such a thing as matter, we could never know it, and all the things we take to be evidence for its existence could exist without it, and can be better explained without recourse to matter.” Also, where Locke would affirm that “matter is the best and simplest explanation for our sensations,” Berkeley would argue that “matter can offer no explanation at all of our sensations in the absence of an explanation of how matter can act on the mind.” Recall in any case that this was an indefatigable problem for Descartes' dualism, and it remains unresolved presently. With regard to number as well – recall Descartes' value for arithmetic truths – Berkeley further states: “That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities are allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects.”

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Comunication as Art and Business

In a previous post, we said that the functions of communication include sales and advertisement, and entertainment and art. In this post, we will summarily explore these two fields of communication endeavor, calling them business and art respectively. Yesterday, we showed how communication is science. Today, we will show how it is art and business. Some universities place communication studies in their Humanities Faculty; some place it in their Business Faculty, and some place it in their Social Science Faculty. It seems to me that the ones that place it in their humanities college see communication as an art; those that place it in their business college see it as business studies, and those that place it in their social science college see it as a science. Communication studies is in many ways all of these things. Indeed, there is no human activity that cannot be explained as a communication activity in some way, shape or form, as they say. There is a maxim in communication studies: Humans cannot not communicate. So it is that everything we do or say is communication.
 
Communication as art flows from Aristotle's techne. It is communication at the service of entertainment, of making things that are pleasing to the senses and to the mind. When we layout newspapers and magazines to look beautiful and to appeal to the readers' eyes, we are engaged in communication as art. When we make radio or audiovisual broadcast content to be appealing, we are appealing to the eyes and ears of viewers and listeners. It is the same with advertisements. Many of them make us laugh - think for example of many of the Geico commercials, like the pig driving a convertible, or the Pillsbury doughboy on his way to a baking convention. These skits are so pleasing to the senses and the mind that they entertain in very substantial ways. Communication as art is creativity: creativity in story telling; in design; in composition - in everything that pleases human beings as sensate and sensible animals, possessed with reason. But again, even animals can be pleased or perturbed, depending on the artistic content of communication. A case is told of a chimpanzee that turned away each time a particular scene of its favorite movie came on: the scene was of the emotional parting ways of two people that loved each other. The chimpanzee turned away so it would not have to witness the sad spectacle. I know Aristotle limited his techne to humans alone, but I disagree with him on this point. I think that non-human animals are capable of techne. When beavers build dams for example, what are they displaying if not techne? When birds build nests, is it not owing to techne? I think animals are capable of techne.
 
Communication as business flows from Aristotle's phronesis. This is another virtue I think even animals are capable of. Aristotle calls it practical wisdom. Business in my opinion is the height of practical wisdom. The ability to be prudent with finances - and another word for phronesis by the way is prudence - is a chief talent in the effective conduct of business. Advertisement, integrated marketing communication campaigns; public relations and publicity - these are all instances of communication at the service of business. When goods and services are manufactured and ready to be sold to the prospective consumer, we need to make sure that such prospects know that the goods and services are available. This is where communication comes in. Through communication, awareness of the presence of goods and services is shared by the producer or marketer with the prospect. Everything from door-to-door selling to the sophisticated use of ads and campaigns are business or marketing communications. And so ads are both artistic and commercial expressions of communication endeavor. They please, and they sell products and services. Commercials also sell candidates for political office. Approved messages over especially television allow us to see and hear the people we want to elect to positions of power. We want to be aware of their track records. We want to be aware of their personalities. We want to be aware of all the things they can do for us once elected. Communication in this regard helps us with decision-making. It gives us the power to shape our sociopolitical destiny. Communication is very important in the public sphere.
 
Research into the use of communication in the public sphere is a feature of contemporary communication studies. A philosophy of communication borrowing from Heidegger in this regard would challenge communication to be authentic, and to appeal to the truest situation of phusis, so that human societies can better live up to the metaphysical standard that reason and language prescribe. Linguistic communication in any case is social and communal, and its Dasein speaks volumes of human progress from prehistoric tactile communication to the ever-dynamic technological breakthroughs in Internet instantaneity. A philosophy of communication would borrow from Wittgenstein and propose clarity in meaning; a semantic underpinning to mere syntax of words and pictures. It would borrow from Augustine's call for signification, and from Heidegger's clarion call to "the things themselves." A metaphysical approach to human communication is underscored by the functionality of meaning in the direction of human affairs in the public sphere; the organization of people and groups in a network of participatory frameworks all working harmoniously for the progress of the human species. A philosophy of communication serves as Locke's substratum that holds together the otherwise disparate communications we are perennially bombarded with by all the media of communication seeking our attention as we go about our daily doing and business.

Monday, November 18, 2013

Communication as Science: An Informal Summary Overview of Communication Research

When we talk of research in Communication, we usually approach it from a positivistic standpoint. In this regard, we consider three questions: ontological, epistemological and axiological ones. By way of ontology, we ask who is doing the research; in other words, what the instrument of research is. By way of epistemology, we ask how it is we will gather data and conduct analysis; in other words, the method of research. And by way of axiology, we are concerned about values. Should we be concerned about values and ethics in the conduct of research, especially research concerning human persons? Research in communication is a growing field of endeavor, and is useful in making communication studies scientific.

There are two broad fields of communication research: quantitative, and qualitative. One way to differentiate between the two is to call quantitative research the one dealing with numbers and statistics and math, while qualitative is the one dealing with words and explanatory sentences and so forth. Another way to differentiate between the two is to call quantitative research survey, the one dealing with preparing questionnaires and administering them to respondents; gathering responses and constructing tables and statistics to analyze data collected; in other words, intrusive research, while qualitative research would proceed by way of ethnography and observation, and interpretation, which would not be intrusive. 

The characteristics of communication research - indeed, any research - are as follows: objectivity, replicability, reliability, utility and verifiability. By objective, it must be true research and not simply a person's opinion. By replicability, it must lead to the same result if another person attempted it; in other words, it must be methodical. By reliability, the method used must be trustworthy; and by verifiability, the results must be valid. There is also something called triangulation. This is the process of conducting corollary research to verify results from a previous research. There are various types of triangulation, such as: researcher triangulation, where another researcher conducts the same research to verify the previous researcher's results. There is method triangulation, where the same researcher uses another method to verify results obtained via use of a different method, say qualitative to verify quantitative; there is also subject triangulation, and so forth. True research in other words must be valid. And it should be useful to the community; useful for solving social and other problems, to justify their being carried out in the first place.

Take for example, a research on the consumption behavior of people living in an apartment building. A researcher could prepare a questionnaire to ask questions like: What do you consume in a week? How much do the items you consume in a week cost, and so forth. The researcher would then distribute the questionnaire to the residents of the apartment building. After they have responded, the researcher would collect and analyze quantitatively by means of tables and graphs and statistical tools. Or, the researcher could simply go through the dumpster and see what empty cans and wrappers and so forth the residents have discarded and tell from those what sort of consumption was taking place. The former would be quantitative and intrusive; the latter would be qualitative and non-intrusive. The researcher could even use both methods to triangulate one another (method triangulation), and then apply the results in planning for behavior modification (utility). The researcher could also allow someone else use his or her method(s) and see if they arrive at the same results (researcher triangulation), and then take appropriate steps to apply the research, and justify its being conducted in the first place. 

Research concerning human persons should be carried out with care, because in the past, some people have conducted unethical research involving human persons, research that has demeaned human persons, such as in Nazi Germany, and research motivated by racial hatred in other parts of the world. Today, in many universities, approval boards are set up to make sure that researchers intending to conduct studies involving human persons are held to high axiological and ethical standards. By way of ontology again, we see that in quantitative research the instrument is usually questionnaires and non-personal tools. In qualitative or interpretive research it is the observation of the researcher himself or herself that is the instrument. This is why triangulation is useful. Deductive and inductive methods are used to go from data arrangement to inference making in research. Both methods have flaws and advantages, and again, this is where triangulation comes in handy. Research in any case is useful for prediction and modification of human behavior.

Sunday, November 17, 2013

An Informal Summary Overview of Human Communication

When we define human communication loosely to mean the communication that takes place among human beings, then we can include mass communications, which are the interactions among human beings that are conducted via mass media. But when we define human communication narrowly, we can say it is all non-mediated communication. In other words, a narrow definition of human communication is that which does not involve intervening mass media between the human persons interacting with one another. These sorts of communication include: intrapersonal (or non-social) communication, such as introspection or the many ways the brain coordinates with the central nervous system and the rest of the human body. Also, interpersonal communication, such as takes place in dyads (communications among two people) or in small group situations, or even in public forums, such as rallies, public speaking events and so forth. Included herein is organizational communication, a significant feature of studies in human communication. We also get to talk about communication theory and research. These are the sorts of topics I dealt with during my master's degree program in communication at Wichita State.
 
To begin with, dyadic communication is face-to-face, intimate, communication among two people, such as a husband and wife discussing family issues, or a set of lovers having a heart-to-heart. Any communication situation involving two people is dyadic. Everyday conversations between say, women returning from the market or boys from soccer practice, or girls from volleyball tryouts - these are all dyadic communication situations. They involve verbal and nonverbal cues, and they are sender-receiver conducted. The change of roles (sending and receiving) is more instantaneous than in most communications. Interpersonal communication situations in any case also involve small groups, such as club meetings, or conferences and symposia, etc. At these small group gatherings of three to say, fifty people, there is a lesser degree of intimacy among sender-receiver participants, and feedback may not be as instantaneous as in the case with dyadic communication. There is in any case the use  of verbal and nonverbal cues to facilitate communication. Interpersonal communication situations also include public interaction, such as rallies, public speaking events and the like. Here, the main speaker is somewhat removed from the large crowd of fifty-one to even a million people gathered at an arena. The speaker uses a microphone and loud speakers. The level of intimacy is lesser than in the small group situation, and even though there are nonverbal as well as verbal cues, reliance is had more on verbal than nonverbal cues.
 
We must not in any case confuse public communication with mass communication. A public address system such as microphones and loudspeakers are not mass media. Public address systems are simply augmentation for the speaker's voice at a public communication situation. No matter how large the audience of a public communication event is if no medium of mass communication is used, it is not mass communication. Hence, the word, mass, does not necessarily mean the number of people, but the fact that the communication was conducted via a mass medium, such as a book, a newspaper, a magazine, an almanac; or a radio, a television, a film or the Internet. And so, a single boy reading a book alone in his room is engaged in mass communication, while a man talking to one hundred thousand people with only a microphone is not engaged in mass communication. The things with mass communication that set it apart from public and other interpersonal communications is that the medium of communication used, be it print or broadcast, enables the message encoded therein to be communicated in a different space and a different time. For example, Mr. A writes a book or a newspaper article in Ontario on March 26, 1957, and it is read by someone in Ouagadougou on August 3, 2013. Public communication cannot accomplish such a feat. To receive the message of a public communication event, you have to be there at the venue to listen to the voice of the speaker.
 
Another thing about mass media one must note is that mass media are institutional affairs. Mass media are collaborative situations. Think of a newspaper for example: we have the reporter, the editor, the publisher and so forth; in a radio or television, we have the editor, the caster, the reporter, and so forth. Even a book: we have the writer, the editor, the publisher and so forth. In mass media operations, several people come together and assume different roles in the production of mass communication. Each of these people is called a "gatekeeper." Gatekeeper is one of the jargon of communication studies. A gatekeeper is someone who cuts out, adds to or reorganizes mass communication content. So for example a reporter gets a news story. He or she brings it into the newsroom. A copy editor goes through it - such editor may cut out, add to, or reorganize it. It then goes to the layout editor. Because of space constraints, the layout editor may cut out, add to, or reorganize the content. It then gets to a sub editor, and then the editor, who also has to worry about the editorial character or personality of the paper, and in that case cuts, or adds or changes the content, and then the publisher, and so forth. It's the same with books and electronic contents as well. Mass communication is collaborative and institutional.
 
Interpersonal communication on the other hand is more personal. But again, that does not mean that mass communication may not be taking place at the same time say, public communication is. If you attend a rally for example and monitors are provided at the back for the crowd that cannot see the speaker; the people in the front, who do not see the monitor, are engaged in public communication, while those that see the monitor at the back and hear the speaker through the monitor are also engaged in mass communication (in addition to public communication). Also, recall the lone fellow reading a book (who by that token is engaged in mass communication); if he or she is also talking with a friend or friends at the same time, that fellow is engaged in both mass communication (reading the book) and interpersonal communication. One significant aspect of human communication in any case, as we have said, is organizational communication. This is the sort of communication that takes place in organizations, be they businesses or other kinds of organizations.
 
In organizational communications, we speak of paradigms of communication, such as horizontal and vertical communications. Horizontal communications take place from employee to employee, and are more informal and social. Vertical communications on the other hand take place from employer to employee and are more formal and less social. Vertical communication events include: promotions, assignment of tasks within the organization; termination of contracts, and so forth. Horizontal communications on the other hand include: a co-worker inviting one over after work for a game of Ping-Pong, or a co-worker hosting a get-together after work hours for his or her colleagues. Other paradigms in organizational communications include: network and linear paradigms; the former which are more compatible with horizontal communications, and the latter which are more compatible with vertical ones. Various theories arising from research have been advanced with regard to organizational communication behavior, and many of them are borrowed from the fields of sociology and social psychology, such as the X, the Y, and the Z paradigms of organizational behavior. A few have also been borrowed from economics, such as studies about workplace productivity and personnel relations, as well as public relations. Share- and stake-holder relations are also very important aspects of organizational communications, even though Public Relations, since Ivy Lee, has become in itself a burgeoning field of study.
 
Communication is so much fun. We'll continue to talk about communication for the next few posts.

Saturday, November 16, 2013

An Informal Summary Overview of What I learned in Mass Communication

When I stepped into my very first class in Communication in January 2002, I wondered what it was all about. The professor waved a book in the air and said: "You all must get this textbook. It is the required reading." The book was called An Introduction to Mass Communication. I looked at it carefully. In that book was the secret to understanding what I had signed up for. Later that day, when classes were over, I bought the book. I took it home and eagerly began to read it. I was reading my first book in the world of communication. A few of the things I learned from reading that book were: An old approach to communication studies saw communication as a linear activity. Based on the old broadcast model, communication was simply the case where a sender packaged a message and sent it through a channel to a receiver, who accepted the message in toto. There was no opportunity for feedback. Some of the theories of media effects that thrived in this paradigm were: the almighty effects model, which gave media messages overwhelming power over their audiences; the hypodermic needle theory, which gave media messages direct and powerful impact over their audiences, and the social control theory, which gave the media the ability to control society. The variables that supported the old school of media effects were: a belief that mass communication was a stimulus-response activity; a belief that audiences were more in tune with the media than with one another; a belief that audiences were not intelligent or sophisticated enough to make their own choices and depended on the media to make such choices for them, and a belief in the instantaneous, conversionary power of mass communication. These variables supported propaganda machines in closed societies as well. They were also applied to socio-political situations such as voting behavior.
 
Intervening variables in any case put paid to the old school paradigm of media effects. Mass communication became no longer a stimulus-response activity where the media chose for the audience and controlled their tastes, but a network paradigm where audience members were seen to be more in touch with one another than the media, through their membership of peer groups, organizations in church or in the workplace, and extended family members and opinion leaders. Self-perception theories and the selective processes of exposure, perception, retention and recall, as well as increasing socio-political awareness on the part of audience members, all led to a new, limited-effects paradigm of communication. This new paradigm gave communication only a limited set of function-specific effects over audiences and included the element of feedback, effectively turning communication into a circular process involving not a sender and a receiver, but sender-receivers who interchanged roles. And so, when a person was in the actual process of sending a message to a listener or reader, the listener or reader was a potential sender who could retort, or report, or write back. The sender would then become the receiver, and the receiver the sender. Even traditional broadcast programs these days have phone-in components to ensure that the element of feedback remains a significant feature in contemporary understanding of communication.
 
In my first semester of college, I also took a required class called African Traditional Communication. It was fascinating. A few of the cool things I learned in that class were: African traditional communication began like most pre-historic communication systems by relying heavily on the spoken word and the indefatigable memory of "walking libraries" that were charged with remembering with astonishing fidelity the history of African societies. The names of regents; the stories of battles with other tribes; the economic agenda and oral constitutions of towns and cities were memorized in accurate detail and communicated from one person to another. This was formal communication, more like what newspapers would be today. Informal communication, which would include interpersonal conversations at gatherings such as childbirths, weddings, public dances and so on would not need to be remembered with such fidelity. Women would also gossip in the market place or on their way back from the stream, and so forth. Men would discuss affairs in the public square or on their way back from the farm - these were all informal communications.
 
African traditional communications also served as the basis for sociopolitical organization, from the level of the nuclear family, to the umunna (or kinship), to the clan, and to the village or autonomous community. The heads of families in such situations served as arbiters of disputes; brokers of peace among feuding factions, and overseers of events and decision-making. They served as pillars of authority, and relied heavily on the words of the "walking libraries" earlier mentioned. Indeed, the death of any of these "walking libraries" would be akin to the burning of a community library in our time. African traditional communications also relied on devices such as the ikoro, which was a huge, hollowed-out drum, placed at the center of the village square and used to broadcast messages to the entire village. If there was say, a bad harvest; or war, or any catastrophe, the ikoro would be beaten a certain way, and the villagers would know a calamity had hit, because of the sort of sound the ikoro was emitting. If there was good news on the contrary, the ikoro would be beaten somehow else: to celebrate victory, or to crown a king, and so forth. The ikoro could also be used to summon the entire village, where a town crier with gong and voice may be used to summon parts of the village or a few households. The ikoro could be compared to the modern day radio. There were other communication events in African traditional communication systems, such as public dances, wedding ceremonies and so forth. At these events, certain prescribed bodily movements were veritable nonverbal communications. Chinua Achebe's novel Things Fall Apart also records some prescribed communication behaviors useful for visiting with others and participating fully in the life of a traditional African community. There are other such works.
 
Mass Communication has been defined as "messages communicated to a large number of people through a mass medium." And to understand mass communication involves understanding the medium, especially as Marshall McLuhan would say that "the medium is the message," in mass communication. And so as an undergrad, I had to take classes in newspaper production (I remember how hard this class in particular was, what with the laying out of type in the exam hall and sweating my brains out); radio broadcast production, and television production and management. I also had to take classes in magazine production, film-making, and printing (actually the class was called Introduction to Typing). We were also taught to say cool things like "writing for the eye" (print communication) and "writing for the ear" (broadcast communication). We also took a couple classes in media law, where we learnt about things like libel, slander and so forth. Plus we took classes in English, French, Psychology, Reasoning, and Sociology. My undergraduate study was illuminating and rich. I am grateful for those four years at Imo State University. Tomorrow, I will give an informal, summary overview of what I learned in Human Communication at the master's level, where the emphasis shifted from media communication to: communication theory and research; public speaking; organizational communication, and crises management.