Tuesday, December 3, 2013

A Succinct Version of George Berkeley's Arguments Against Material Substances and in Favor of Spirits, Part 3

In Berkeley's own words: “Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds of entirely distinct and heterogeneous (concepts), and which have nothing common but the same, to wit, spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting and dependent beings.” Concerning how Berkeley argues that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter, although we have ideas of neither,” Berkeley further states: “We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we do not have ideas.” He also states: “To me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse.” In other words, Berkeley is asserting that we arrive at notions of spirits by inward perception. And it is based on these notions, obtained through inward perception, that we can speak coherently of spirits in a completely different way than about our sensations or ideas. 

If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.” 

He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, beings which perceive; and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”

He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent on differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. Also, spirits are called understanding or will, depending on how they operate. 

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