Berkeley advances a master argument by which he seeks to conclusively undermine the possible reality of material objects. The master argument posits that it is not even conceivable that a material object can exist outside the mind. In this regard, Berkeley proposes that we venture to think of a material object that “exists” unperceived. He shows that this is impossible because, as soon as we do begin to think (conceive) of such an object, the object has become perceived. Berkeley states thus: “But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This, therefore, is nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind, but it does not show that you can conceive it possible that the objects of your thought may exist without the mind.” In other words, Berkeley’s master argument is: We can allow for the existence of mind-independent material objects only if we can conceive of them as “existing” unconceived. But there is no way we can even begin to conceive of something existing unconceived because the moment we attempt to, the supposedly unconceived object becomes in fact conceived. Hence, we cannot allow for the existence of mind-independent material substances.
Berkeley also proposes as further attempt to undermine the possible existence of material objects that there is an element of relativity with regard to the perception of sensible objects. In other words, Berkeley observes that the way individual perceivers sense material things differs from one to another individual. He shows in this regard how one thing may feel cold to one person and hot to another; how one thing may taste sweet to an individual palate and bitter to another. Arguably, these qualities (such as taste, color, temperature) are secondary qualities; and philosophers such as Locke, Newton and Descartes have argued that material substances are preferably known by means of their primary qualities, such as: extension, solidity, motion, number, and figure. But Berkeley argues that even the so-called primary qualities of material objects must be seen to be just as mind-dependent as the secondary qualities.
In view of the foregoing, he demonstrates that no material object may be conceived of as having only primary qualities and, as such, primary qualities are inseparable from secondary ones and, if this be the case, they must exist in the same place as secondary qualities do: the mind. In this regard, he states: “For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.”
Therefore, for Berkeley, mind-independent material substances do not exist [and even if they could exist, we could never know them.] He states in this regard thus: “To me it is evident (that) those words (absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind) mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all. So far, the paper has advanced Berkeley’s arguments against the mind-independent existence of material objects. Having marshaled out Berkeley’s ideas and responses to objections to his view in the foregoing paragraphs, I assert that Berkeley makes a successful argument against the “existence” of material substances.
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