Wednesday, December 4, 2013

A Succinct Version of George Berkeley's Arguments Against Material Substances and in Favor of Spirits, Part 4

In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind (spirit), which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.” [Effects such as willing and understanding, as earlier shown.]

Further in the paragraph, Berkeley offers a challenge in this regard to anyone who can have ideas of the powers of will and understanding, or of substance or being in general. These spiritual realities in Berkeley's view cannot “be represented by any idea whatsoever.” For Berkeley, in other words, only notions can be had of minds, or souls or spirits, and their operations, such as willing, or loving, or hating or the like. Indeed, the active source of all ideas of sense for Berkeley is some “spiritual substance.” For Berkeley, this spiritual substance is not finite, since it should be able to convey to the finite mind the entire natural order. This spiritual substance would rather be infinite.

Conclusively, Berkeley’s argument in my estimation in successful. For Berkeley, there are only two things: passive ideas of sense, and active spirits, who do the perceiving. Indeed, Berkeley is staunchly of the view that in addition to perceived things (ideas), there are perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them.” So, reality is either that which perceives (mind, spirit, soul), or that which is perceived, and nothing else.

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