Friday, August 16, 2013

Aristotle's On Plants and Animals, Heavenly Bodies, and Being: A Summary Discourse

Aristotle speaks about heavenly bodies, and of plants and animals. The former are more distant than the latter, and are eternal, belonging to the celestial aspect of nature. The latter on the other hand are closer to us and are more familiar than are celestial beings. Aristotle states in this regard: “On the other hand, since we can know better and know more about the substances around us, the knowledge of them has some superiority. Further, the fact that they are closer to us and more akin to our nature compensates to some degree for the philosophy about divine things.” (Aristotle, Parts of Animals 1.5, 645a5)
 
In the study of heavenly beings, the object of thought is the aspect of natural study that concerns planetary reality. Aristotle sees these heavenly bodies as more glorious than the bodies nearer us. Aristotle states in this regard: “For even though we have little contact with divine substances, still their honorable nature makes it pleasanter to know them than to know all the things around us.” (Aristotle, Parts of Animals 1.5, 644a30) However, in his discourse on the Parts of Animals 1.5, Aristotle is making a case for the study of animals and plants, trying to accord them importance alongside the heavenly bodies earlier described. (Aristotle, Parts of Animals 1.5, 644b22-645a5) Aristotle states: “Among the substances constituted by nature, some we say neither come to be nor perish for all time, and others share in coming to be and perishing.” By the foregoing, he refers to heavenly (divine) and biological (plants and animal) substances. 

Speaking of heavenly bodies as distinct from animal and vegetable bodies, Aristotle demonstrates how heavenly bodies are incapable of diminution or increase because they have, circular in motion as they are, no contraries, whereas it is in contraries that qualitative motions including decay and generation are found. Aristotle states: “It is equally reasonable to assume that this body will be ungenerated and indestructible and exempt from increase and alteration, since everything that comes to be comes into being from its contrary and in some substrate, and passes away likewise in a substrate by the action of the contrary into the contrary.” (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3 270a15) He states as well that since the heavenly body is incapable of increase or diminution, it cannot be altered.

Aristotle also avers that “there cannot be more than one heaven.” (Aristotle, On the Heavens, 1.8 276a18), which is owing to its primacy of place with regard to things in the natural world and a buttress to its conception as finer and more glorious than the bodies of plants and animals, as has been earlier stated. Aristotle further posits: “We must show not only that the heaven is one, but also that more than one heaven is impossible and further that, as exempt from decay and generation, the heaven is eternal.” (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.9 277b 27)

Thus Aristotle characterizes heavenly bodies as neither coming to be nor perishing; honorable as well as divine, and pleasanter to know than the bodies of animals and plants. Animal and plant bodies on the other hand are characterized by sharing in coming to be and passing away; availing of greater opportunity and more numerous methods of being known, and being more akin to human nature. Both substances in any case are natural ones, and they differ from a third kind of substance, the metaphysical.

The passage indeed hints at the human desire to know. This is an essential part of being human, owing to the possession of a rational aspect of the human soul – this is what sets the human apart from all the other members of the natural world. Characteristic of a knowledgeable person in this regard is having exact knowledge. To have exact knowledge or understanding of something is to have a viable memory of it, as separate from its qualities. In his Categories, Aristotle identifies the substance (from the Latin “substare,” which means “to stand firm at the root”) or essence of something, which “stands firm at the core of something” even when all the peripheral qualities it has are taken away from it, as well as several attendant qualities of a substance, such as: quantity, relation, quality, time, location and habitus.

Exact knowledge in view of the foregoing is to know the substance of what is, as distinct from its qualities. This means that there are in fact different kinds of knowing. A person could know only the qualities of something, but not what something really is, for example: if a person says that an apple is a red and juicy fruit, that individual has forgotten that there are green apples too. In this case, the person has not grasped what an apple is. To have grasped what a thing is, is to have judged correctly that every physical manifestation of a thing is that thing even if its physical characteristics in one manifestation differ from another such manifestation. 

Ignorance, opinion and knowledge are three states afforded with respect to the different degrees of understanding among humans. An ignorant person knows neither the substance nor the qualities of what is, and is not interested in knowing. An opinionated person knows some of the qualities of what is, but not its substance. It is the knowledgeable person that knows the substance over and above the qualities which modify the substance (his knowledge of the qualities does not confuse him from his grasp of the essence). 

Aristotle is of the view that the attainment of exact knowledge as opposed to opinion comes about by abstraction. We start out by observing natural phenomena. These natural objects are composites of matter and form. We observe them by means of sense perception. We note their shapes, their colors – in short their physical characteristics. But we do not observe only one sample of each natural phenomenon. In the course of human experience, we encounter various samples and invariably notice differences, however subtle. These nuances make us realize that being is separate from the physical manifestations thereof. 

Phenomenological investigation therefore leads us to abstract from particular reality that we know through sense perception to categorical reality, which we know only through the mind. We realize that whether an apple is red or green there are other things that make it still an apple. In other words, we become familiar with “appleness,” rather than the observable qualities of individual apples that form our experience of it. We transcend the composite of material and formal reality and appreciate forms in themselves, knowing in this way being qua being. This is metaphysical knowledge. Physical knowledge on the other hand is the sense perception of particular phenomena, the knowledge obtained before abstraction.

Physical reality hence, composite as it is, avails us of the opportunity to describe the things we see around us: trees, people, and stones – all kinds of material reality. We analyze them in terms of their attributes and their parts. Note nonetheless, as has been earlier stated, that study of natural phenomena includes the study of plant and animal bodies, but also heavenly bodies, the former of which are closer to us and offer more opportunities for understanding, and the latter which are geographically removed from us and are more glorious to contemplate.

In conclusion, the argument of the passage is that there are both heavenly bodies, and the bodies of plants and animals. We as humans desire to know both. Where it would seem that knowledge of heavenly bodies is more desirable, knowledge of animal and plant bodies is similarly important. I do agree with Aristotle’s, because I believe that in a world like ours that is increasingly dynamic, there is need to know more and more about the physical world, including plants and animals: about biology and its related sciences, as these practical sciences will further help us to master our world economically, socially and culturally. 

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