In Berkeley's own words: “Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds of entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the same, to wit, spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting and dependent beings.” Concerning how Berkeley argues that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter, although we have ideas of neither,” Berkeley further states: “We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we do not have ideas.” He also states: “To me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse.” [Take not of the words “knowledge” and “discourse.”]
If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.” He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, being which perceive, and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”
He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent of differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea, Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.”
An internal summary is here apt. Having explored the earlier argument of Berkeley's against the existence of mind-independent material substances, the paper has embarked on a critique of Berkeley's argument in favor of the existence of active substances called spirits, or minds, or souls. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “In addition to perceived things (ideas), Berkeley posits perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them. Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive. This suggests that Berkeley has replaced one kind of dualism, of mind and matter, with another kind of dualism, of mind and idea.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. The subsequent portion of this paper will concern itself with how we can have ideas of neither spirits nor matter, as per paper requirements.
According to Collins: “In one sense, then, the mind is unknowable: it cannot be known through ideas.” [“This forces Berkeley to posit a new means of knowledge, especially different from the idea. This is his fundamental distinction between idea and notion.”] In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind, which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.”
If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.” He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, being which perceive, and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”
He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent of differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea, Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.”
An internal summary is here apt. Having explored the earlier argument of Berkeley's against the existence of mind-independent material substances, the paper has embarked on a critique of Berkeley's argument in favor of the existence of active substances called spirits, or minds, or souls. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “In addition to perceived things (ideas), Berkeley posits perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them. Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive. This suggests that Berkeley has replaced one kind of dualism, of mind and matter, with another kind of dualism, of mind and idea.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. The subsequent portion of this paper will concern itself with how we can have ideas of neither spirits nor matter, as per paper requirements.
According to Collins: “In one sense, then, the mind is unknowable: it cannot be known through ideas.” [“This forces Berkeley to posit a new means of knowledge, especially different from the idea. This is his fundamental distinction between idea and notion.”] In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind, which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.”
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