In Berkeley's own words: “Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds of entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the same, to wit, spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances; the latter are inert, fleeting and dependent beings.” Concerning how Berkeley argues that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter, although we have ideas of neither,” Berkeley further states: “We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we do not have ideas.” He also states: “To me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse.” [Take note of the words “knowledge” and “discourse.”]
If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.”
He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, beings which perceive, and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”
He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent of differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea, Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. The subsequent portion of this paper will concern itself with how we can have ideas of neither spirits nor matter, as per paper requirements.
According to Collins: “In one sense, then, the mind is unknowable: it cannot be known through ideas.” In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind, which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.”
Further in the paragraph, Berkeley offers a challenge in this regard to anyone who can have ideas of the powers of will and understanding, or of substance or being in general. These spiritual realities in Berkeley's view cannot “be represented by any idea whatsoever.” For Berkeley, only notions can be had of minds, or souls or spirits, and their operations, such as willing, or loving, or hating or the like. According to Collins, the only strictly immediate knowledge is the perceptual content of one's own mind. Collins goes further to state in this regard: “Berkeley tries his best to avoid the solipsistic implications of this description of the cognitive situation. He bases his escape from solipsism mainly upon the demonstration of God's existence which is both intelligible to the average man and yet strictly demonstrative.” Collins further states: “Perceiving is an operation of the mind, but what we perceive lies beyond our control. Some other active principle must be invoked in order to account for the actual presentation of sensory contents to our mind, since we cannot voluntarily determine its content. Now, the sole source of the ideas cannot come from material substance, the existence of which has been disproved.” Collins pursues the discourse further by showing how sensible things cannot be responsible for ideas in the mind, since they “partake of the inert, casually inefficacious character of all ideas”; and so the active source of all ideas of sense for Berkeley is “some spiritual substance.” For Berkeley, this spiritual substance is not finite, since it should be able to convey to the finite mind the entire natural order. This spiritual substance would rather be infinite.
Berkeley’s argument in my estimation in successful. For Berkeley, there are only two things: passive ideas of sense, and active spirits, who do the perceiving. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “In addition to perceived things (ideas), Berkeley posits perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them.” Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive.” So, reality is either that which perceives (mind, spirit, soul), or that which is perceived, and nothing else. We do not know material substances very simply because they do not exist. They are ideas contained in the mind. And we do not know spirits because they are beyond the finite capacity of ideas in the mind. God, the infinite mind or spirit, however knows everything, and communicates to the individual mind notions of spirits and the activity of spirits (perceiving), in such a fashion that knowledge of reality ultimately depends on God's existence. As an exercise in idealism, it is a coherent and plausible argument. It may not necessarily appeal to common-sense, as we ordinarily think of common-sense. But recall that earlier in this paper, it was shown that Berkeley saw his view to be better in keeping with the dictates of common-sense than the materialist (and “impious”) views of empiricists such as Locke and Newton.
If indeed we properly speak only of things that are, then the following words of Berkeley's further underscore how it is that “we can think and speak coherently about spirits, but not about matter”: “But it will be objected that if there is no idea signified by the terms, soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.”
He further states: “What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.” Berkeley is subsequently at pains to distinguish between spirit, which are active beings, beings which perceive, and ideas, which are objects of perception. He states in this regard: “I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”
He goes further to say, concerning our having notions of spirits: “In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it.” He also avers that “we know other spirits by means of our own soul.” Berkeley is in any case insistent of differentiating spirits from ideas, and the knowledge of spirits from the knowledge of ideas. He states in this regard: “I suppose it is plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea, Spirits and ideas are so wholly different that when we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound.” And so, because spirits are real, active and existent, we can conceive notions of them and advance coherent, categorical discourse concerning them, unlike matter, which do not exist independently of mind. The subsequent portion of this paper will concern itself with how we can have ideas of neither spirits nor matter, as per paper requirements.
According to Collins: “In one sense, then, the mind is unknowable: it cannot be known through ideas.” In other words, only through notions can an intuitive grasp of the mind, which lies beyond the realm of ideas, be had. To underscore the fact that the mind lies beyond the realm of ideas, Berkeley states: “Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or a spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produces.”
Further in the paragraph, Berkeley offers a challenge in this regard to anyone who can have ideas of the powers of will and understanding, or of substance or being in general. These spiritual realities in Berkeley's view cannot “be represented by any idea whatsoever.” For Berkeley, only notions can be had of minds, or souls or spirits, and their operations, such as willing, or loving, or hating or the like. According to Collins, the only strictly immediate knowledge is the perceptual content of one's own mind. Collins goes further to state in this regard: “Berkeley tries his best to avoid the solipsistic implications of this description of the cognitive situation. He bases his escape from solipsism mainly upon the demonstration of God's existence which is both intelligible to the average man and yet strictly demonstrative.” Collins further states: “Perceiving is an operation of the mind, but what we perceive lies beyond our control. Some other active principle must be invoked in order to account for the actual presentation of sensory contents to our mind, since we cannot voluntarily determine its content. Now, the sole source of the ideas cannot come from material substance, the existence of which has been disproved.” Collins pursues the discourse further by showing how sensible things cannot be responsible for ideas in the mind, since they “partake of the inert, casually inefficacious character of all ideas”; and so the active source of all ideas of sense for Berkeley is “some spiritual substance.” For Berkeley, this spiritual substance is not finite, since it should be able to convey to the finite mind the entire natural order. This spiritual substance would rather be infinite.
Berkeley’s argument in my estimation in successful. For Berkeley, there are only two things: passive ideas of sense, and active spirits, who do the perceiving. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it: “In addition to perceived things (ideas), Berkeley posits perceivers, which are minds or spirits, as he often terms them.” Spirits, he emphasizes, are totally different in kind from ideas, for they are active where ideas are passive.” So, reality is either that which perceives (mind, spirit, soul), or that which is perceived, and nothing else. We do not know material substances very simply because they do not exist. They are ideas contained in the mind. And we do not know spirits because they are beyond the finite capacity of ideas in the mind. God, the infinite mind or spirit, however knows everything, and communicates to the individual mind notions of spirits and the activity of spirits (perceiving), in such a fashion that knowledge of reality ultimately depends on God's existence. As an exercise in idealism, it is a coherent and plausible argument. It may not necessarily appeal to common-sense, as we ordinarily think of common-sense. But recall that earlier in this paper, it was shown that Berkeley saw his view to be better in keeping with the dictates of common-sense than the materialist (and “impious”) views of empiricists such as Locke and Newton.
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