This essay will use St. Thomas Aquinas’ ideas on being and essence to broach a metaphysically driven understanding of the nature of the unborn human being. This paper will examine the foregoing in relation to the priority of form to matter (act to potency) in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This paper will show how the unborn is just as human as the adult. It shall treat two concerns: first, the pre-eminence of Being with regard to matter-form composites; and second, the priority of essence with regard to matter. The passage from Aquinas’ On Being and Essence that this paper exposes and interprets is Chapter 2, Paragraph 2, on page 35 of the book.
Aquinas explains at length what being is. In this regard, there are multiple considerations for the term. In a sense, being may be said to be anything of which an affirmation can be made, even when the thing is a privation, a no-thing. In another sense, it could refer to the essence or nature of a thing. It could also refer to the ten categories of Aristotle, of substance and nine predicable realities thereof. It could, specifically for Aquinas, refer to the esse, or Being of a thing. This last sense is the basis on which Aquinas draws a distinction between simple and composite substances or beings. A simple substance is one whose essence is the same as its existence. God is the perfect example of a simple substance. Humans for example are by contrast composite substances, in whom essence and existence are separate realities.
The essence of human is rational animal. This is the principle of difference that defines the human species from among the elements that populate the genus animal. The human body, which is the principle of individuation for particular human beings, is actually informed by the essential principle and prescribed by its final cause. Form and matter constitute the essence of human beings, but the actual existence (esse) of a human is prior to its essence. The one necessarily subsists with the other, and between them cannot there be conceived a separation, lest neither be termed to be a tangible substance; and both devolve into, at best, conceptual being.
Aquinas states: “Neither can it be said that essence signifies the relation between matter and form, or something added to them, because this would necessarily be accidental or not belonging to the thing, nor could the thing be known through it, both of which are characteristics of the essence.” What this means is that the essence of a thing has attributes that are essential to itself. Hence, Aquinas further states: “Anything that comes after that does not give matter its actual being, but rather a certain kind of actual being, as accidents do. When a form of this kind is acquired, we say that something comes into being not purely and simply but in a certain respect.” As a formal reality, nonetheless, Being contains the actuality of what a composite is potentially, regardless of the stage of development a composite is in reference to its act.
Albeit a tiny speck, a zygote is a human being. If this is so – and it is – then to commit abortion is tantamount to committing murder. This is why the Church seriously frowns at abortion. This paper approaches the ethics of abortion from a metaphysical or philosophical standpoint. With reference to Chapter 2, Number 2 of Aquinas’ On Being and Essence, it is posited that the essence of an unborn human being is humanity, in much the same way that the essence of a fully grown human being is humanity. Aquinas states in this regard thus: “For through form, which actualizes matter, matter becomes an actual being and a particular thing.” What this means is that the principle of being, the essence of a thing, is its form and not just its matter. And so, even though the fully grown human being looks a certain way and an unborn human being looks a different way, the essence or nature of both – what each is for it to be a thing – is the same. So, the unborn human being is the metaphysical equal of the fully grown human being.
To emphasize this point, refer again to these words by Thomas Aquinas: “Anything that comes after that [that is, after matter becomes informed, such as in this specific regard in the conception or fertilization process], does not give matter its basic actual being, but rather a certain kind of actual being as accidents do.” In other words, even though with growth and development a zygote becomes an adult (“something” accidentally becomes “something else”), essentially or metaphysically speaking, they both stay the same – human. Aquinas adds: “When a form of this kind is acquired (adult from zygote through material change), we say that something comes into being not purely and simply, but in a certain respect (in other words, per accidens).” [Also recall the distinction made regarding defined and undefined matter.]
Aristotle states in this regard: “Next, each substance is generated by something which has the same nature (for man begets man), and nature is a principle in the thing itself.” For Aristotle, matter is not included in the essence of a thing. Matter serves as the potency principle, in which perfection is possibly found, and so the unborn only changes to the fully-grown adult because of the presence of matter (body) while its form stays the same. [The possibility of change or improvement cannot be in the form of the thing, but only in the matter; not in the act principle, but only in the potency principle.]
For Baruch Brody, the definition of the term “human” is by no means linguistic, but truly metaphysical, and any attempt to define human being in linguistic terms is bound to limit its semantic scope. It is only when humans are defined from a metaphysical standpoint that the philosophical intention of the word is adequately captured. This adequate conception definitely includes the unborn at different stages of its development in the womb. The definition of humanity as the form of the composite of body and soul (the substance of which individual human beings express) is then seen as useful in preserving the dignity of even the unborn.
The focus of this essay has been to establish that the ethics of abortion, a contemporary moral issue, can be understood from a philosophical standpoint, without drawing from theology and Church moral teaching. Even though legal provisions sanction a woman’s right to abort her unborn child, the exercise of cultured reason would propose that abortion is the metaphysical equivalent of murder. This is because the essence of the unborn child and that of a fully grown human being is the same. This Being of the unborn is not accidental to the composite of matter and form in the human situation, but is both prior and pre-eminent to it. Furthermore, human dignity is ratified by a metaphysical rather than a linguistic definition of the term “human being” [which is form and matter, in that order], in such a fashion as to include the unborn.
Aquinas explains at length what being is. In this regard, there are multiple considerations for the term. In a sense, being may be said to be anything of which an affirmation can be made, even when the thing is a privation, a no-thing. In another sense, it could refer to the essence or nature of a thing. It could also refer to the ten categories of Aristotle, of substance and nine predicable realities thereof. It could, specifically for Aquinas, refer to the esse, or Being of a thing. This last sense is the basis on which Aquinas draws a distinction between simple and composite substances or beings. A simple substance is one whose essence is the same as its existence. God is the perfect example of a simple substance. Humans for example are by contrast composite substances, in whom essence and existence are separate realities.
The essence of human is rational animal. This is the principle of difference that defines the human species from among the elements that populate the genus animal. The human body, which is the principle of individuation for particular human beings, is actually informed by the essential principle and prescribed by its final cause. Form and matter constitute the essence of human beings, but the actual existence (esse) of a human is prior to its essence. The one necessarily subsists with the other, and between them cannot there be conceived a separation, lest neither be termed to be a tangible substance; and both devolve into, at best, conceptual being.
Aquinas states: “Neither can it be said that essence signifies the relation between matter and form, or something added to them, because this would necessarily be accidental or not belonging to the thing, nor could the thing be known through it, both of which are characteristics of the essence.” What this means is that the essence of a thing has attributes that are essential to itself. Hence, Aquinas further states: “Anything that comes after that does not give matter its actual being, but rather a certain kind of actual being, as accidents do. When a form of this kind is acquired, we say that something comes into being not purely and simply but in a certain respect.” As a formal reality, nonetheless, Being contains the actuality of what a composite is potentially, regardless of the stage of development a composite is in reference to its act.
Albeit a tiny speck, a zygote is a human being. If this is so – and it is – then to commit abortion is tantamount to committing murder. This is why the Church seriously frowns at abortion. This paper approaches the ethics of abortion from a metaphysical or philosophical standpoint. With reference to Chapter 2, Number 2 of Aquinas’ On Being and Essence, it is posited that the essence of an unborn human being is humanity, in much the same way that the essence of a fully grown human being is humanity. Aquinas states in this regard thus: “For through form, which actualizes matter, matter becomes an actual being and a particular thing.” What this means is that the principle of being, the essence of a thing, is its form and not just its matter. And so, even though the fully grown human being looks a certain way and an unborn human being looks a different way, the essence or nature of both – what each is for it to be a thing – is the same. So, the unborn human being is the metaphysical equal of the fully grown human being.
To emphasize this point, refer again to these words by Thomas Aquinas: “Anything that comes after that [that is, after matter becomes informed, such as in this specific regard in the conception or fertilization process], does not give matter its basic actual being, but rather a certain kind of actual being as accidents do.” In other words, even though with growth and development a zygote becomes an adult (“something” accidentally becomes “something else”), essentially or metaphysically speaking, they both stay the same – human. Aquinas adds: “When a form of this kind is acquired (adult from zygote through material change), we say that something comes into being not purely and simply, but in a certain respect (in other words, per accidens).” [Also recall the distinction made regarding defined and undefined matter.]
Aristotle states in this regard: “Next, each substance is generated by something which has the same nature (for man begets man), and nature is a principle in the thing itself.” For Aristotle, matter is not included in the essence of a thing. Matter serves as the potency principle, in which perfection is possibly found, and so the unborn only changes to the fully-grown adult because of the presence of matter (body) while its form stays the same. [The possibility of change or improvement cannot be in the form of the thing, but only in the matter; not in the act principle, but only in the potency principle.]
For Baruch Brody, the definition of the term “human” is by no means linguistic, but truly metaphysical, and any attempt to define human being in linguistic terms is bound to limit its semantic scope. It is only when humans are defined from a metaphysical standpoint that the philosophical intention of the word is adequately captured. This adequate conception definitely includes the unborn at different stages of its development in the womb. The definition of humanity as the form of the composite of body and soul (the substance of which individual human beings express) is then seen as useful in preserving the dignity of even the unborn.
The focus of this essay has been to establish that the ethics of abortion, a contemporary moral issue, can be understood from a philosophical standpoint, without drawing from theology and Church moral teaching. Even though legal provisions sanction a woman’s right to abort her unborn child, the exercise of cultured reason would propose that abortion is the metaphysical equivalent of murder. This is because the essence of the unborn child and that of a fully grown human being is the same. This Being of the unborn is not accidental to the composite of matter and form in the human situation, but is both prior and pre-eminent to it. Furthermore, human dignity is ratified by a metaphysical rather than a linguistic definition of the term “human being” [which is form and matter, in that order], in such a fashion as to include the unborn.
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