Berkeley's concern for what he described as a declining state of reverence for the spiritual underpinned his radical philosophy of immaterialism. Berkeley himself states in this regard: “Were it necessary to add any further proof against the existence of matter, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of greater moment in religion.” Broad is of the view that, in denying the existence of material substances, Berkeley was denying the theories of scientists and philosophers like Newton, Locke and Descartes. In Berkeley's own words, his treatise was to foray into “the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of skepticism, atheism and irreligion.” Berkeley believed that the rejection of matter would put paid to the encroaching doubt of the religious. In other words, if the grounds for atheism are that material things exist without support from God, and Berkeley could show that material things did not even exist to begin with, the entire philosophical edifice of materialism would be crushed, paving the way for a revitalization of religious thought.
The qualities ascribed to matter by philosophers such as Locke, Newton and Descartes include: extension, solidity, motion, number, figure; as well as color, taste, smell and sound. The previous five are primary qualities, while the latter four are secondary qualities. According to Collins, a crucial starting point in Berkeley's task of undermining the existence of material substances was to “show that there is no essential epistemological difference between primary and secondary qualities.” In other words, even the so-called primary qualities of matter must be seen to be just as mind-dependent as the secondary qualities. Berkeley does this in two ways: firstly, he shows that no material object may be conceived of as having only primary qualities and, as such, primary qualities are inseparable from secondary ones and, if this be the case, they must exist in the same place as secondary qualities do, the mind. Berkeley states thus: “For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.” Secondly, Berkeley demonstrates that, similar to secondary qualities, primary qualities may appear to be different depending on the perceiver. Berkeley clearly is trying to argue categorically for the dependence on human perception of material substances.
According to Broad, Berkeley's arguments against materialism may be divided into three groups: firstly, direct arguments for his view; secondly, attacks on certain alternative views, and thirdly, discussion of certain possible objections to his view. To begin with, Berkeley is of the view that material things are things perceived by the mind and not self-existing substances [Berkeley himself states in this regard concerning material things: “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”] He is also of the view that we perceive nothing other than our own ideas and sensations [Berkeley himself states as follows in this regard: “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow.”] And thirdly that it is repugnant that any of our ideas or sensations or a combination of them should exist unperceived [Berkeley states in this regard as follows: “And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?”] In other words, with regard to the first item of Berkeley's view, the houses, mountains and so forth which we perceive do not have actual existence in themselves, but only perceptual existence (in the mind). In other words, not even the primary qualities attributable to them justify their existence separate from the mind.
The qualities ascribed to matter by philosophers such as Locke, Newton and Descartes include: extension, solidity, motion, number, figure; as well as color, taste, smell and sound. The previous five are primary qualities, while the latter four are secondary qualities. According to Collins, a crucial starting point in Berkeley's task of undermining the existence of material substances was to “show that there is no essential epistemological difference between primary and secondary qualities.” In other words, even the so-called primary qualities of matter must be seen to be just as mind-dependent as the secondary qualities. Berkeley does this in two ways: firstly, he shows that no material object may be conceived of as having only primary qualities and, as such, primary qualities are inseparable from secondary ones and, if this be the case, they must exist in the same place as secondary qualities do, the mind. Berkeley states thus: “For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.” Secondly, Berkeley demonstrates that, similar to secondary qualities, primary qualities may appear to be different depending on the perceiver. Berkeley clearly is trying to argue categorically for the dependence on human perception of material substances.
According to Broad, Berkeley's arguments against materialism may be divided into three groups: firstly, direct arguments for his view; secondly, attacks on certain alternative views, and thirdly, discussion of certain possible objections to his view. To begin with, Berkeley is of the view that material things are things perceived by the mind and not self-existing substances [Berkeley himself states in this regard concerning material things: “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”] He is also of the view that we perceive nothing other than our own ideas and sensations [Berkeley himself states as follows in this regard: “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow.”] And thirdly that it is repugnant that any of our ideas or sensations or a combination of them should exist unperceived [Berkeley states in this regard as follows: “And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?”] In other words, with regard to the first item of Berkeley's view, the houses, mountains and so forth which we perceive do not have actual existence in themselves, but only perceptual existence (in the mind). In other words, not even the primary qualities attributable to them justify their existence separate from the mind.
Concerning the second item of Berkeley's view, it would appear that all we can perceive are our sensations. We have no certain epistemological relationship between what we perceive in our mind and any corresponding reality outside the mind. Berkeley himself states thus: “In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.” And with regard to the third item of Berkeley's view, Broad puts it succinctly when he states: “Is it not self-contradictory to suppose that there might be unsensed sensibilia?” In other words, if material substances are only sensibilia (things that must be sensed in order to exist), they cannot then be properly said to exist when they are not being sensed. In this regard, Berkeley states: “The table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed – meaning by that that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does actually perceive it. There was an odor; that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. That is all I can understand by these and the like expressions.” Berkeley further states: “It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind. To me it is evident that those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all.” He further states in the same paragraph in which the aforementioned words are contained: “It is on this therefore that I insist namely, that 'the absolute existence of unthinking things' are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction.”
By way of attacks on alternative views to his immaterialism, Berkeley attempts to show how absurd it is to admit of mind-independent existence of material substances. To begin with, it has already been established how Berkeley refuted Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities of material substances, and how such refutation categorically placed material things squarely in the set of sensibilia. Berkeley in any case further disputes with Locke concerning the latter's view on “substances,” which he defined as the substratum, or support, for the qualities of material things. For Berkeley, this so-called substratum should properly be called mind (or spirit), since it has already been shown that the qualities Locke speaks about are ideas for Berkeley, and ideas exist only in the mind. In other words, rather than a substratum holding in place qualities, we should properly speak of a mind or spirit holding in place ideas. [Berkeley discusses the foregoing in his Treatise, Part 1 § 16-18, where he uses the word substratum interchangeably with “support.”]
By way of attacks on alternative views to his immaterialism, Berkeley attempts to show how absurd it is to admit of mind-independent existence of material substances. To begin with, it has already been established how Berkeley refuted Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities of material substances, and how such refutation categorically placed material things squarely in the set of sensibilia. Berkeley in any case further disputes with Locke concerning the latter's view on “substances,” which he defined as the substratum, or support, for the qualities of material things. For Berkeley, this so-called substratum should properly be called mind (or spirit), since it has already been shown that the qualities Locke speaks about are ideas for Berkeley, and ideas exist only in the mind. In other words, rather than a substratum holding in place qualities, we should properly speak of a mind or spirit holding in place ideas. [Berkeley discusses the foregoing in his Treatise, Part 1 § 16-18, where he uses the word substratum interchangeably with “support.”]
Furthermore, according to Berkeley, “even if there were such a thing as matter, we could never know it, and all the things we take to be evidence for its existence could exist without it, and can be better explained without recourse to matter.” Also, where Locke would affirm that “matter is the best and simplest explanation for our sensations,” Berkeley would argue that “matter can offer no explanation at all of our sensations in the absence of an explanation of how matter can act on the mind.” Recall in any case that this was an indefatigable problem for Descartes' dualism, and it remains unresolved presently. With regard to number as well – recall Descartes' value for arithmetic truths – Berkeley further states: “That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities are allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects.”
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