An internal summary is here apt. It has been shown that a concern for the preservation and propagation of religion drove Berkeley to launch an attack on the philosophical underpinnings of irreligion, viz materialism. In this regard, “Berkeley thinks that the supposition of (the existence of) matter causes more problems for humanity than it solves. It allows skepticism to creep in by allowing one to make a distinction between the world as it really is and the world as it appears (when there is no such distinction for Berkeley), and it prompts impiety, not least because its defenders are in effect arguing that 'God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless and serve no manner of purpose,' because one can get all the sensations without needing matter.” It has also been shown that Berkeley denied there being a difference between primary and secondary qualities of material substances, and this denial further undermined the existence of mind-independent material substances. It has further been shown that Berkeley's arguments against materialism may be divided into three groups: firstly, direct arguments for his view; secondly, attacks on certain alternative views, and thirdly, discussion of certain possible objections to his view. So far, direct arguments in support for Berkeley's view have been proffered. Also, attacks on alternative views, notably those of Locke and Descartes, have been provided. The next portion of this essay will afford discussion on certain possible objections to Berkeley's position with regard to material substances and show how Berkeley counters these objections, and how in so doing he paves the way for the furtherance of his immaterialism.
To begin with, Hume objects to Berkeley's immaterialism by stating that “if the existence of ideas is one with their being perceived, then (at least, for all we can know) the sensible world ceases to exist whenever the acts of perception themselves cease. This would lead to the doctrine of intermittent existence and a consequent denial of the permanence of sense things.” This criticism “forced Berkeley to appeal to the distinction between God's mind and our own.” This distinction allowed Berkeley to aver that “sensible things depend on the mind of God, which always wills and perceives them. In other words, even when Berkeley is not perceiving the desk in his office when he steps out of the room, he assumes it remains there in his office because God is perceiving it. This in a sense is a proof of the existence of God a la Berkeley.
Another objection is that Berkeley's immaterialism “destroys the objective world,” by reducing otherwise concrete things to “subjective states and then to sheer illusion.” This charge of illusionism is counteracted by Berkeley who is of the view that it is in fact his philosophical position that reinforces the common-sense view of the world. Broad has stated in this regard: “[Berkeley] always maintains that he is denying only the theories of certain scientists and philosophers, such as the Newtonians, Descartes and Locke. He asserts that his own view admits the existence of all that plain men understand by 'bodies' or 'material things." Berkeley goes further to insist on this common-sense paradigm of immaterialism when he states: “When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to anyone the truth and evidence of what is said here and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.”
Yet another objection to Berkeley's argument, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is that “the argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and un-thought of. Why not? Simply because in order to conceive of any such things, we must ourselves be conceiving, i.e., thinking, of them. However, such an argument seems to conflate the representation (what we conceive with) and the represented (what we conceive of – the content of our thought). Once we make this distinction, we realize that although we must have some conception or representation in order to conceive of something, and that representation is in some sense thought of, it does not follow (contra Berkeley) that what we conceive of must be a thought-of object. That is, when we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we (arguably) conceive of an unthought-of object, though of course we must employ a thought in order to accomplish this feat. Thus (as many commentators have observed), this argument fails.” Berkeley's argument does not necessarily fall apart for this. Berkeley would state in this regard that the “representation” here spoken of is one and the same with the “represented,” since the represented does not exist in itself, but is summarily reduced to the representation, as an idea that, passive as it is, cannot exist except in the activity of a mind, or soul or spirit.
To begin with, Hume objects to Berkeley's immaterialism by stating that “if the existence of ideas is one with their being perceived, then (at least, for all we can know) the sensible world ceases to exist whenever the acts of perception themselves cease. This would lead to the doctrine of intermittent existence and a consequent denial of the permanence of sense things.” This criticism “forced Berkeley to appeal to the distinction between God's mind and our own.” This distinction allowed Berkeley to aver that “sensible things depend on the mind of God, which always wills and perceives them. In other words, even when Berkeley is not perceiving the desk in his office when he steps out of the room, he assumes it remains there in his office because God is perceiving it. This in a sense is a proof of the existence of God a la Berkeley.
Another objection is that Berkeley's immaterialism “destroys the objective world,” by reducing otherwise concrete things to “subjective states and then to sheer illusion.” This charge of illusionism is counteracted by Berkeley who is of the view that it is in fact his philosophical position that reinforces the common-sense view of the world. Broad has stated in this regard: “[Berkeley] always maintains that he is denying only the theories of certain scientists and philosophers, such as the Newtonians, Descartes and Locke. He asserts that his own view admits the existence of all that plain men understand by 'bodies' or 'material things." Berkeley goes further to insist on this common-sense paradigm of immaterialism when he states: “When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to anyone the truth and evidence of what is said here and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.”
Yet another objection to Berkeley's argument, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is that “the argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and un-thought of. Why not? Simply because in order to conceive of any such things, we must ourselves be conceiving, i.e., thinking, of them. However, such an argument seems to conflate the representation (what we conceive with) and the represented (what we conceive of – the content of our thought). Once we make this distinction, we realize that although we must have some conception or representation in order to conceive of something, and that representation is in some sense thought of, it does not follow (contra Berkeley) that what we conceive of must be a thought-of object. That is, when we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we (arguably) conceive of an unthought-of object, though of course we must employ a thought in order to accomplish this feat. Thus (as many commentators have observed), this argument fails.” Berkeley's argument does not necessarily fall apart for this. Berkeley would state in this regard that the “representation” here spoken of is one and the same with the “represented,” since the represented does not exist in itself, but is summarily reduced to the representation, as an idea that, passive as it is, cannot exist except in the activity of a mind, or soul or spirit.
Berkeley ultimately argues then that: “All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive – there is nothing of power or agency included in them.” Collins would state in this regard: “If matter does not vanish in a cloud of empty words, it is the locus of a flagrant set of contradictions. Material substance is (for Berkeley) inert.” In other words, it is nothingness. It is non-existent. Hence, Berkeley reiterates his claim that material substances have no reality in themselves. The subsequent will inquire into whether he makes a successful argument. In this regard, Collins states: “The success of Berkeley's argument depends upon the soundness of the commonly held seventeenth-century thesis concerning the subjectivity of the secondary qualities. The Galilean doctrine on secondary and primary qualities was methodologically useful for securing the mathematical interpretation of the material world, but the progressive empiricist criticism revealed its inadequacy as a general philosophical tool. After Berkeley's critique, the problem of secondary and primary qualities became a peripheral one, since non-mathematical principles of interpretation came to the fore.”
Furthermore, Collins states: “Largely for the sake of securing an advantage over skepticism, atheism, and irreligious materialism, Berkeley sacrifices matter and yet retains the more basic Lockean conception of the philosophical method and its object, the idea.” In other words, he reduces the problem concerning matter to “a problem concerning perception.” “Hence Berkeley proves, not that the idea is the only sensible existent, but that a starting point in the analysis of ideas can tell nothing about the act of existing exercised by material things.” Also, the aforementioned equation of secondary and primary qualities underpins the categorical subjectivity of material substances and firmly fixes them as mind-dependent. Based on these reasons, I assert that Berkeley makes a successful argument against materialism, here defined as “the view that mind-independent material objects exist.”
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