This essay will expose and interpret Aristotle’s thoughts on potentiality and actuality especially as contained in the selected short passage from his Metaphysics (1045b30-1052a12). It will explain, using the Ibo construct of iheogawu, which is subsequently explained, how these terms relate to being, and how the views of Democritus (atoms and the void) and Anaxagoras (the elements of all things are in all things) are to be discredited in cognizance of the fact that a thing is in potency toward what it was teleologically oriented to be in act, and nothing else.
Aristotle explains in the passage under review what potentiality is, and what actuality is, and how they differ from each other. Potentiality to begin with is not synonymous with “potencies” (1046a7), nor is it synonymous with all the linguistic similarities of the word, which by way of semantics refer to “powers” (1046a5-9). Potentiality for our purposes refers to the situation of orientation toward act, ultimately occasioned by a final cause. Aristotle in any case identifies two states of potentiality: a first, and a second, the latter especially of which denotes generation, or becoming that, in keeping with nature, is always toward an act. The former state of affairs may be underpinned by inertia, while the latter may be motive toward actuality in such a fashion that progressive negotiation of inchoate privation is availed of (1046a20-1046b27).
With regard to actuality, which is prior to potentiality, Aristotle succinctly defines it as “the existence of a thing, not in the way in which we say that something exists potentially” (1048a33-34). In the subsequent lines after the aforementioned definition, he reiterates that actuality is mostly prior to potentiality. He also warns that actuality differs from analogy. The situation of actuality being prior to potentiality is here considered. Aristotle states in this regard as follows: “To every such potentiality [as denoted by “every principle of change or of rest”], actuality is prior both in formula and is substance. With regard to the relationship between final cause and actuality, Aristotle states: “For the final cause is a principle, and generation is for the sake of an end; and the end is an actuality, and potentiality is viewed as being for the sake of this. Aristotle also states: “And so it is evident that the substance or the form is an actuality.”
The fact that actuality precedes potentiality qualitatively denies what Democritus would have us believe concerning atoms and the void, or what Anaxagoras would assert concerning the elements of all things being in all things. Here, I introduce the Ibo word, “iheogawu.” It is the transliteration of the Greek word for “essence,” rendered as “what it was to be a thing.” The concept of iheogawu contains within itself only the natural and essential attributes of a thing, and teleologically orients that which is becoming (that which is in the second mode of potentiality as hitherto depicted) towards its act.
Aristotle explains in the passage under review what potentiality is, and what actuality is, and how they differ from each other. Potentiality to begin with is not synonymous with “potencies” (1046a7), nor is it synonymous with all the linguistic similarities of the word, which by way of semantics refer to “powers” (1046a5-9). Potentiality for our purposes refers to the situation of orientation toward act, ultimately occasioned by a final cause. Aristotle in any case identifies two states of potentiality: a first, and a second, the latter especially of which denotes generation, or becoming that, in keeping with nature, is always toward an act. The former state of affairs may be underpinned by inertia, while the latter may be motive toward actuality in such a fashion that progressive negotiation of inchoate privation is availed of (1046a20-1046b27).
With regard to actuality, which is prior to potentiality, Aristotle succinctly defines it as “the existence of a thing, not in the way in which we say that something exists potentially” (1048a33-34). In the subsequent lines after the aforementioned definition, he reiterates that actuality is mostly prior to potentiality. He also warns that actuality differs from analogy. The situation of actuality being prior to potentiality is here considered. Aristotle states in this regard as follows: “To every such potentiality [as denoted by “every principle of change or of rest”], actuality is prior both in formula and is substance. With regard to the relationship between final cause and actuality, Aristotle states: “For the final cause is a principle, and generation is for the sake of an end; and the end is an actuality, and potentiality is viewed as being for the sake of this. Aristotle also states: “And so it is evident that the substance or the form is an actuality.”
The fact that actuality precedes potentiality qualitatively denies what Democritus would have us believe concerning atoms and the void, or what Anaxagoras would assert concerning the elements of all things being in all things. Here, I introduce the Ibo word, “iheogawu.” It is the transliteration of the Greek word for “essence,” rendered as “what it was to be a thing.” The concept of iheogawu contains within itself only the natural and essential attributes of a thing, and teleologically orients that which is becoming (that which is in the second mode of potentiality as hitherto depicted) towards its act.
Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle states: “Having rejected the false opinion about potency and actuality, the Philosopher now establishes the truth about them; and in regard to this he does two things. First he shows how actuality is prior to potency in the same subject; and second, how potency is brought to a state of actuality.”
In other words, and drawing on the construct of iheogawu, it is clear that anything that is in potency towards something is in potency to it by way of teleology, and by way of nature. The essence of a thing therefore is a principle that orients all potential beings toward their actual forms. Anaxagoras would rather have us believe that if an acorn became an oak tree, it happened that way only because Nature selected the elements of “oak tree” and played these up in preference to the other elements inherent in the acorn, elements of possibly everything else existing in the world. Democritus in turn, seeing reality as atoms and the void, would fail to denote a formal and a final cause responsible for the actuality of potentiality.
Aristotle’s position on act and potency puts paid to Parmenides’ position that being cannot come from non-being. This view saw being as whole, complete and of a single substance; unchanging, and incapable of motion or change. Aristotle is of the view that what Parmenides would in this regard call non-being is actually potential being. Heraclitus on the other hand saw reality as perpetually in flux, stating characteristically in this regard that “we do not step in the same river twice.” According to Polskie Towarzystwo, “Although reality is dynamic, potential, and changing, at the same time it has in itself certain necessary, identical and static structures. Reality is ‘composed’ of a factor or factors that are ‘potential’ and which influence the change and dynamism of being, and at the same time reality possesses in itself factors which ‘actualize,’ determine and make necessary existence, and so also actualize, determine and make necessary the knowledge of the being.”
In this way, Aristotle marries the views of Heraclitus and Parmenides, with concomitant merits for metaphysics and by extension epistemology, what Towarzystwo would refer to as “knowledge of the being,” as hitherto stipulated. In any case, it bears reiterating that the reason a delineated definition for potentiality was selected for this paper was to sidestep the possibility of confusion with innate and acquired potencies, the latter of which may include for example the capacity to play a musical instrument, a capacity that must be learned, or similarly the capacity to become a medical doctor which must likewise be learned.
The gamut of this discourse therefore necessarily includes the concept of nature. Aristotle defines nature as “the generation of growing objects; the first constituent from which a growing object grows, and the source from which motion first begins in each natural thing, and which belongs to that thing qua that thing.” This nature is the necessary principle of potentiality in the thing. In other words, a potential being will become what is in its nature to become. This is a reiteration of what has been aforesaid.
Furthermore, according to Edith Stein, the material principle of composite or substantial reality, which is the principle of motion or change or potentiality, bears consideration if one is to understand how it is possible to assert that the change or motion in a substance allows it to remain the same, from a cosmological point of view. Interestingly enough, this position has been severally taken in class lectures. Noteworthy in this regard remains the fact that the essence of a thing survives through all the inchoate stages of progression from potency to act. The essence therefore gives a thing in potency its natural teleology of becoming.
The central idea of this essay has been to show that, with specific reference to the nature of a thing, actuality precedes potentiality and orients that which is in potency toward that which it was to be for it to be a thing (its essence), and nothing else. Unlike the view of Anaxagoras that places the elements of all things in all things, this essay has sought to say that whatever a thing in potency will be in act is what its nature would have it be. The essence of a thing in potency to act necessarily affords in this regard a natural teleology of becoming that bridges inchoate stages of potency with the perfection of act, and so underscores the fact that, when considered in this delineated perspective, act precedes potency.
In other words, and drawing on the construct of iheogawu, it is clear that anything that is in potency towards something is in potency to it by way of teleology, and by way of nature. The essence of a thing therefore is a principle that orients all potential beings toward their actual forms. Anaxagoras would rather have us believe that if an acorn became an oak tree, it happened that way only because Nature selected the elements of “oak tree” and played these up in preference to the other elements inherent in the acorn, elements of possibly everything else existing in the world. Democritus in turn, seeing reality as atoms and the void, would fail to denote a formal and a final cause responsible for the actuality of potentiality.
Aristotle’s position on act and potency puts paid to Parmenides’ position that being cannot come from non-being. This view saw being as whole, complete and of a single substance; unchanging, and incapable of motion or change. Aristotle is of the view that what Parmenides would in this regard call non-being is actually potential being. Heraclitus on the other hand saw reality as perpetually in flux, stating characteristically in this regard that “we do not step in the same river twice.” According to Polskie Towarzystwo, “Although reality is dynamic, potential, and changing, at the same time it has in itself certain necessary, identical and static structures. Reality is ‘composed’ of a factor or factors that are ‘potential’ and which influence the change and dynamism of being, and at the same time reality possesses in itself factors which ‘actualize,’ determine and make necessary existence, and so also actualize, determine and make necessary the knowledge of the being.”
In this way, Aristotle marries the views of Heraclitus and Parmenides, with concomitant merits for metaphysics and by extension epistemology, what Towarzystwo would refer to as “knowledge of the being,” as hitherto stipulated. In any case, it bears reiterating that the reason a delineated definition for potentiality was selected for this paper was to sidestep the possibility of confusion with innate and acquired potencies, the latter of which may include for example the capacity to play a musical instrument, a capacity that must be learned, or similarly the capacity to become a medical doctor which must likewise be learned.
The gamut of this discourse therefore necessarily includes the concept of nature. Aristotle defines nature as “the generation of growing objects; the first constituent from which a growing object grows, and the source from which motion first begins in each natural thing, and which belongs to that thing qua that thing.” This nature is the necessary principle of potentiality in the thing. In other words, a potential being will become what is in its nature to become. This is a reiteration of what has been aforesaid.
Furthermore, according to Edith Stein, the material principle of composite or substantial reality, which is the principle of motion or change or potentiality, bears consideration if one is to understand how it is possible to assert that the change or motion in a substance allows it to remain the same, from a cosmological point of view. Interestingly enough, this position has been severally taken in class lectures. Noteworthy in this regard remains the fact that the essence of a thing survives through all the inchoate stages of progression from potency to act. The essence therefore gives a thing in potency its natural teleology of becoming.
The central idea of this essay has been to show that, with specific reference to the nature of a thing, actuality precedes potentiality and orients that which is in potency toward that which it was to be for it to be a thing (its essence), and nothing else. Unlike the view of Anaxagoras that places the elements of all things in all things, this essay has sought to say that whatever a thing in potency will be in act is what its nature would have it be. The essence of a thing in potency to act necessarily affords in this regard a natural teleology of becoming that bridges inchoate stages of potency with the perfection of act, and so underscores the fact that, when considered in this delineated perspective, act precedes potency.
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