The qualities ascribed to matter by philosophers such as Locke, Newton and Descartes include: extension, solidity, motion, number, figure; as well as color, taste, smell and sound. The previous five are primary qualities, while the latter four are secondary qualities. According to Collins, a crucial starting point in Berkeley's task of undermining the existence of material substances was to “show that there is no essential epistemological difference between primary and secondary qualities.” In other words, even the so-called primary qualities of matter must be seen to be just as mind-dependent as the secondary qualities. Berkeley does this in two ways: firstly, he shows that no material object may be conceived of as having only primary qualities and, as such, primary qualities are inseparable from secondary ones and, if this be the case, they must exist in the same place as secondary qualities do, the mind. Berkeley states thus: “For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must in addition give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where, therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must be also, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.” Secondly, Berkeley demonstrates that, similar to secondary qualities, primary qualities may appear to be different depending on the perceiver. Berkeley clearly is trying to argue in categorical terms for the necessary dependence on human perception (mental process) of material substances.
Berkeley is of the view that material things are things perceived by the mind and not self-existing substances. He states in this regard concerning material things: “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.” He is also of the view that we perceive nothing other than our own ideas and sensations. He states as follows in this regard: “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow.” For Berkeley, furthermore, it is repugnant that any of our ideas or sensations or a combination of them should exist unperceived. He states in this regard as follows: “And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?” Berkeley further states thus: “In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.” Broad also states concerning Berkeley’s view: “Is it not self-contradictory to suppose that there might be unsensed sensibilia?”
In other words, if material substances are only sensibilia (things that must be sensed in order to exist), they cannot then be properly said to exist when they are not being sensed. In this regard, Berkeley states: “The table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed – meaning by that that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does actually perceive it. There was an odor; that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. That is all I can understand by these and the like expressions.” Berkeley further states: “It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind. To me it is evident that those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all.” He further states in the same paragraph in which the aforementioned words are contained: “It is on this therefore that I insist namely, that 'the absolute existence of unthinking things' are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction.”
Furthermore, according to Berkeley, “even if there were such a thing as matter, we could never know it, and all the things we take to be evidence for its existence could exist without it, and can be better explained without recourse to matter.” Also, where Locke would affirm that “matter is the best and simplest explanation for our sensations,” Berkeley would argue that “matter can offer no explanation at all of our sensations in the absence of an explanation of how matter can act on the mind.” Recall in any case that this was an indefatigable problem for Descartes' dualism, and it remains unresolved presently. With regard to number as well – recall Descartes' value for arithmetic truths – Berkeley further states: “That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities are allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects.”
Berkeley is of the view that material things are things perceived by the mind and not self-existing substances. He states in this regard concerning material things: “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.” He is also of the view that we perceive nothing other than our own ideas and sensations. He states as follows in this regard: “That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without the mind is what everybody will allow.” For Berkeley, furthermore, it is repugnant that any of our ideas or sensations or a combination of them should exist unperceived. He states in this regard as follows: “And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?” Berkeley further states thus: “In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.” Broad also states concerning Berkeley’s view: “Is it not self-contradictory to suppose that there might be unsensed sensibilia?”
In other words, if material substances are only sensibilia (things that must be sensed in order to exist), they cannot then be properly said to exist when they are not being sensed. In this regard, Berkeley states: “The table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed – meaning by that that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit does actually perceive it. There was an odor; that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. That is all I can understand by these and the like expressions.” Berkeley further states: “It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves or without the mind. To me it is evident that those words mark out either a direct contradiction or else nothing at all.” He further states in the same paragraph in which the aforementioned words are contained: “It is on this therefore that I insist namely, that 'the absolute existence of unthinking things' are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction.”
Furthermore, according to Berkeley, “even if there were such a thing as matter, we could never know it, and all the things we take to be evidence for its existence could exist without it, and can be better explained without recourse to matter.” Also, where Locke would affirm that “matter is the best and simplest explanation for our sensations,” Berkeley would argue that “matter can offer no explanation at all of our sensations in the absence of an explanation of how matter can act on the mind.” Recall in any case that this was an indefatigable problem for Descartes' dualism, and it remains unresolved presently. With regard to number as well – recall Descartes' value for arithmetic truths – Berkeley further states: “That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities are allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects.”
Berkeley ultimately argues then that: “All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive – there is nothing of power or agency included in them.” Collins would state in this regard: “If matter does not vanish in a cloud of empty words, it is the locus of a flagrant set of contradictions. Material substance is (for Berkeley) inert.” In other words, it is nothingness. It is non-existent. Hence, Berkeley reiterates his claim that material substances have no reality in themselves. The subsequent will inquire into whether he makes a successful argument. In this regard, Collins states: “The success of Berkeley's argument depends upon the soundness of the commonly held seventeenth-century thesis concerning the subjectivity of the secondary qualities. The Galilean doctrine on secondary and primary qualities was methodologically useful for securing the mathematical interpretation of the material world, but the progressive empiricist criticism revealed its inadequacy as a general philosophical tool. After Berkeley's critique, the problem of secondary and primary qualities became a peripheral one, since non-mathematical principles of interpretation came to the fore.”
Furthermore, Collins states: “Berkeley sacrifices matter and yet retains the more basic Lockean conception of the philosophical method and its object, the idea.” In other words, he reduces the problem concerning matter to “a problem concerning perception.” “Hence Berkeley proves, not that the idea is the only sensible existent, but that a starting point in the analysis of ideas can tell nothing about the act of existing exercised by material things.” Also, the aforementioned equation of secondary and primary qualities underpins the categorical subjectivity of material substances and firmly fixes them as mind-dependent. Based on these reasons, I assert that Berkeley makes a successful argument against materialism, here defined as “the view that mind-independent material objects exist.”
Furthermore, Collins states: “Berkeley sacrifices matter and yet retains the more basic Lockean conception of the philosophical method and its object, the idea.” In other words, he reduces the problem concerning matter to “a problem concerning perception.” “Hence Berkeley proves, not that the idea is the only sensible existent, but that a starting point in the analysis of ideas can tell nothing about the act of existing exercised by material things.” Also, the aforementioned equation of secondary and primary qualities underpins the categorical subjectivity of material substances and firmly fixes them as mind-dependent. Based on these reasons, I assert that Berkeley makes a successful argument against materialism, here defined as “the view that mind-independent material objects exist.”
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