Descartes starts out his third meditation by “withdrawing all his senses,” and attempting to possibly “blot out from his thoughts all images of corporeal things.” He does this to reestablish the fact that he is properly a thinking thing. Descartes subsequently denotes the existence of ideas present in himself as a thinking thing. He classifies these ideas as follows: “adventitious (coming from without); factitious (coming from the mind’s constructive power), and innate (coming from the inborn dynamism of the mind).” Collins, eminent philosopher, is of the view that Descartes’ idea of God can be tested by using the aforementioned three-fold classification. For Descartes, the idea of God does not have a factitious origin. Descartes in this regard states thus: “I understand by the name ‘God’ a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything else that exists – if anything else exists.” And since Descartes cannot think of God other than in this way, his idea of God does not have a factitious origin.
Collins further asserts thus regarding Descartes’ idea of God: “Nor does it come to him suddenly from without. Indeed, the external origin of any idea is doubtful, at this stage of his meditations.” Descartes has yet to attest to the existence of material things and his own body; he has yet to trust as well the veracity of the ideas supposedly sourced via sensory perception. Indeed, “Descartes’ impulse to believe that some ideas are adventitious may well be erroneous, since it may be due to some unknown power unconsciously at work in the mind.”
Clearly hence, it follows by way of elimination that the idea of God falls into the category of innate, what Collins calls “native to the mind.” Nevertheless, the idea of God albeit innate to Descartes’ mind does not satisfy the problem of God’s existence. It is here necessary to identify and distinguish between formal and objective realities. For Suarez, from the formal standpoint, “all ideas are on the same level and are adequately accounted for by the human mind, in which they reside. Representatively or objectively however, they differ vastly and can be arranged in an ascending order, insofar as they refer to different grades of being.”
According to Collins, “Descartes is sure that, even from the standpoint of their representative reality, all ideas (except that of the infinite being) might be accounted for by himself as a thinking being. The crucial question is whether he is also the adequate source of the representative reality of the idea of an infinitely perfect being.” In other words, Descartes already takes for granted that, for all things which do not have a higher formal reality than he does, his ideas of them may be sourced from within himself; in other words are factitious. However, the principle of efficient causality applied in this regard would stipulate that there must be a greater or equal formal reality in a being as there is in the objective reality in Descartes’ idea of such a being. And since the formal reality of God is greater than Descartes’ own formal reality, he cannot have sourced his idea of God from within himself. Descartes underscores the foregoing by asserting the subsequent clearly and distinctly perceived truths: “that a thing cannot give what it does not have; that something cannot come from nothing; that the more perfect cannot come from the less perfect.”
In view of the foregoing, it is pertinent to aver that a finite thinking thing, such as Descartes is, is inadequate to account for the objective reality of the idea of an infinitely perfect being, such as God is. Albeit, the idea of God also does not come from nothing, nor from a being that has less formal reality than God does. “Hence, it must have been implanted in the human mind by a being which possesses as much reality in a formal, actual way as the idea possesses in a representative way.” Therefore, there must exist the infinitely perfect being, which can properly be said to efficiently cause Descartes’ idea of God. This infinitely perfect being is none other than God himself.
Furthermore, Descartes admits that a thinking thing, such as he is, is not independent or the author of his own being “since in that case he would confer upon himself, in the formal order, whatever reality he can conceive representatively through his ideas. Were it self-caused, the human self would confer infinite perfection upon itself, in correspondence with its idea of God.” Descartes realizes that, juxtaposed with the infinite perfection of God, he is finite and imperfect. “The limited and dependent thing which contains the idea of an infinitely perfect being could neither exist nor endure, except as being caused and conserved in being by the infinite being. The idea of God is innate in the thinking self in the sense that it is, as it were, the seal placed upon his product by the divine artisan.” Descartes states in this regard: “To be sure, it is not astonishing that, in creating me, God should have endowed me with this idea (the idea of God), so that it would be like the mark of the craftsman impressed upon his work, although this mark need not be something distinct from the work itself. But the mere fact that God created me makes it highly plausible that I have somehow been made in his image and likeness, in which the idea of God is contained, by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself.”
An internal summary is here apt. So far, we have stated that Descartes, in his quest to clearly and distinctively perceive reality begins his third meditation by withdrawing as much as possible from sensory perception. Furthermore, he classifies the ideas in his mind as factitious, adventitious and innate. By way of elimination, he identifies his idea of God as innate, since it could neither have sourced from within him nor from the objects of sense experience. This innate idea of God, because of the principle of efficient causality as here applied, must rather be caused by a being with equal or greater formal reality as the objective reality the idea represents or contains. This being is God, who because of his infinite perfection can alone be responsible for the idea of himself that exists in Descartes’ finite and imperfect mind. More so, Descartes, because he is finite and imperfect, depends for sustenance and existence on the infinite and perfect God.
[In any case, the value of attempting to prove the existence of God in his third meditation, occurring as it is after his categorical doubt, is such that Descartes can ground his knowledge of reality on the existence of a God that does not deceive. Descartes states in this regard as follows: “Nor will he one day make it true that I never existed, for it is true now that I do exist. Nor will he even bring it about that perhaps two plus three might equal more or less than five, or similar items in which I recognize an obvious contradiction. And certainly, because I have no reason for thinking that there is a God who is a deceiver (and of course I do not sufficiently know whether there even is a God), the basis for doubting, depending as it does merely on the above hypothesis, is very tenuous and, so to speak, metaphysical. But in order to remove even this basis for doubt, I should at the first opportunity inquire whether there is a God and, if there is, whether or not he can be a deceiver. For if I am ignorant of this, it appears I am never capable of being completely certain about anything else.”]
Furthermore, according to Collins, Descartes exploits a fully guaranteed criterion in the interests of a third approach to proving the existence of God: “that drawn from the perceived connection between essence and existence in the idea of God.” Consequent on the idea of God as an infinitely perfect being, his essence (perfection) contains existence as a property, “just as necessarily as the notion of triangle contains the properties demonstrable of it. The notion of actual and eternal existence is a positive perfection, clearly and distinctly known as belonging to the infinitely perfect essence, and hence it can be affirmed as true of this essence in the actual order. Once existence is seen to be a perfection, I cannot think of God otherwise than as actually existing.”
Having attempted an intricate reconstruction of Descartes’ proof of God’s existence, this paper will subsequently afford objections thereto. To begin with, an objection to Descartes’ argument concerns whether the cogitative process of a finite thinking thing, such as Descartes is, is adequate to grasp the idea of an infinitely perfect being, such as God is. By way of preamble, Collins states thus: “Descartes’ arguments were placed under fire at once. His atheistic opponents objected against the sudden appeal to the principle of efficient causality, whose validity was not established by a distinct, formal argument.” This objection may be extrapolated to include the consideration of whether the idea of an infinite being is an infinite idea. If it is a finite idea, then “the so-called objective or representative reality of it does not demand any special causal explanation.” In other words, according to Descartes’ opponents, if meaning can be adequately accounted for by the mind’s ability to abstract intentional likenesses, and by the contribution of experienced things to our notions, an exception need not be made in the idea of God; and as such the idea of God can be sourced from within Descartes, finite thinking thing that he is, and need not bear any representation to a formal reality outside of Descartes.
Another objection to Descartes’ argument has to do with whether Descartes’ existence may not be (said to be) caused by the proximate chain of efficient causes as depicted by his parents, and their parents, and their parents, ad infinitum. In other words, although Descartes has stated that, being himself a finite and imperfect being, his existence is necessarily caused by an infinite and perfect being – with whose perfection Descartes’ privations are clearly contrasted – the problem arises as to whether Descartes’ existence or being cannot be said to source from a seemingly aggregate infinity of linked efficient causes the collective import of which would afford, in Collin’s words, “a purely mathematical approach to the infinite.” Collins points out in this regard that this proof from the view of efficient causality resembles the Thomistic proof from efficient causality. Recall then, in this regard, Ockham’s position denoting an inability to properly prove the existence of God by way of efficient causality.
Collins further asserts thus regarding Descartes’ idea of God: “Nor does it come to him suddenly from without. Indeed, the external origin of any idea is doubtful, at this stage of his meditations.” Descartes has yet to attest to the existence of material things and his own body; he has yet to trust as well the veracity of the ideas supposedly sourced via sensory perception. Indeed, “Descartes’ impulse to believe that some ideas are adventitious may well be erroneous, since it may be due to some unknown power unconsciously at work in the mind.”
Clearly hence, it follows by way of elimination that the idea of God falls into the category of innate, what Collins calls “native to the mind.” Nevertheless, the idea of God albeit innate to Descartes’ mind does not satisfy the problem of God’s existence. It is here necessary to identify and distinguish between formal and objective realities. For Suarez, from the formal standpoint, “all ideas are on the same level and are adequately accounted for by the human mind, in which they reside. Representatively or objectively however, they differ vastly and can be arranged in an ascending order, insofar as they refer to different grades of being.”
According to Collins, “Descartes is sure that, even from the standpoint of their representative reality, all ideas (except that of the infinite being) might be accounted for by himself as a thinking being. The crucial question is whether he is also the adequate source of the representative reality of the idea of an infinitely perfect being.” In other words, Descartes already takes for granted that, for all things which do not have a higher formal reality than he does, his ideas of them may be sourced from within himself; in other words are factitious. However, the principle of efficient causality applied in this regard would stipulate that there must be a greater or equal formal reality in a being as there is in the objective reality in Descartes’ idea of such a being. And since the formal reality of God is greater than Descartes’ own formal reality, he cannot have sourced his idea of God from within himself. Descartes underscores the foregoing by asserting the subsequent clearly and distinctly perceived truths: “that a thing cannot give what it does not have; that something cannot come from nothing; that the more perfect cannot come from the less perfect.”
In view of the foregoing, it is pertinent to aver that a finite thinking thing, such as Descartes is, is inadequate to account for the objective reality of the idea of an infinitely perfect being, such as God is. Albeit, the idea of God also does not come from nothing, nor from a being that has less formal reality than God does. “Hence, it must have been implanted in the human mind by a being which possesses as much reality in a formal, actual way as the idea possesses in a representative way.” Therefore, there must exist the infinitely perfect being, which can properly be said to efficiently cause Descartes’ idea of God. This infinitely perfect being is none other than God himself.
Furthermore, Descartes admits that a thinking thing, such as he is, is not independent or the author of his own being “since in that case he would confer upon himself, in the formal order, whatever reality he can conceive representatively through his ideas. Were it self-caused, the human self would confer infinite perfection upon itself, in correspondence with its idea of God.” Descartes realizes that, juxtaposed with the infinite perfection of God, he is finite and imperfect. “The limited and dependent thing which contains the idea of an infinitely perfect being could neither exist nor endure, except as being caused and conserved in being by the infinite being. The idea of God is innate in the thinking self in the sense that it is, as it were, the seal placed upon his product by the divine artisan.” Descartes states in this regard: “To be sure, it is not astonishing that, in creating me, God should have endowed me with this idea (the idea of God), so that it would be like the mark of the craftsman impressed upon his work, although this mark need not be something distinct from the work itself. But the mere fact that God created me makes it highly plausible that I have somehow been made in his image and likeness, in which the idea of God is contained, by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself.”
An internal summary is here apt. So far, we have stated that Descartes, in his quest to clearly and distinctively perceive reality begins his third meditation by withdrawing as much as possible from sensory perception. Furthermore, he classifies the ideas in his mind as factitious, adventitious and innate. By way of elimination, he identifies his idea of God as innate, since it could neither have sourced from within him nor from the objects of sense experience. This innate idea of God, because of the principle of efficient causality as here applied, must rather be caused by a being with equal or greater formal reality as the objective reality the idea represents or contains. This being is God, who because of his infinite perfection can alone be responsible for the idea of himself that exists in Descartes’ finite and imperfect mind. More so, Descartes, because he is finite and imperfect, depends for sustenance and existence on the infinite and perfect God.
[In any case, the value of attempting to prove the existence of God in his third meditation, occurring as it is after his categorical doubt, is such that Descartes can ground his knowledge of reality on the existence of a God that does not deceive. Descartes states in this regard as follows: “Nor will he one day make it true that I never existed, for it is true now that I do exist. Nor will he even bring it about that perhaps two plus three might equal more or less than five, or similar items in which I recognize an obvious contradiction. And certainly, because I have no reason for thinking that there is a God who is a deceiver (and of course I do not sufficiently know whether there even is a God), the basis for doubting, depending as it does merely on the above hypothesis, is very tenuous and, so to speak, metaphysical. But in order to remove even this basis for doubt, I should at the first opportunity inquire whether there is a God and, if there is, whether or not he can be a deceiver. For if I am ignorant of this, it appears I am never capable of being completely certain about anything else.”]
Furthermore, according to Collins, Descartes exploits a fully guaranteed criterion in the interests of a third approach to proving the existence of God: “that drawn from the perceived connection between essence and existence in the idea of God.” Consequent on the idea of God as an infinitely perfect being, his essence (perfection) contains existence as a property, “just as necessarily as the notion of triangle contains the properties demonstrable of it. The notion of actual and eternal existence is a positive perfection, clearly and distinctly known as belonging to the infinitely perfect essence, and hence it can be affirmed as true of this essence in the actual order. Once existence is seen to be a perfection, I cannot think of God otherwise than as actually existing.”
Having attempted an intricate reconstruction of Descartes’ proof of God’s existence, this paper will subsequently afford objections thereto. To begin with, an objection to Descartes’ argument concerns whether the cogitative process of a finite thinking thing, such as Descartes is, is adequate to grasp the idea of an infinitely perfect being, such as God is. By way of preamble, Collins states thus: “Descartes’ arguments were placed under fire at once. His atheistic opponents objected against the sudden appeal to the principle of efficient causality, whose validity was not established by a distinct, formal argument.” This objection may be extrapolated to include the consideration of whether the idea of an infinite being is an infinite idea. If it is a finite idea, then “the so-called objective or representative reality of it does not demand any special causal explanation.” In other words, according to Descartes’ opponents, if meaning can be adequately accounted for by the mind’s ability to abstract intentional likenesses, and by the contribution of experienced things to our notions, an exception need not be made in the idea of God; and as such the idea of God can be sourced from within Descartes, finite thinking thing that he is, and need not bear any representation to a formal reality outside of Descartes.
Another objection to Descartes’ argument has to do with whether Descartes’ existence may not be (said to be) caused by the proximate chain of efficient causes as depicted by his parents, and their parents, and their parents, ad infinitum. In other words, although Descartes has stated that, being himself a finite and imperfect being, his existence is necessarily caused by an infinite and perfect being – with whose perfection Descartes’ privations are clearly contrasted – the problem arises as to whether Descartes’ existence or being cannot be said to source from a seemingly aggregate infinity of linked efficient causes the collective import of which would afford, in Collin’s words, “a purely mathematical approach to the infinite.” Collins points out in this regard that this proof from the view of efficient causality resembles the Thomistic proof from efficient causality. Recall then, in this regard, Ockham’s position denoting an inability to properly prove the existence of God by way of efficient causality.
“It was pointed out to Descartes, moreover, that the traditional view of the idea of God’s infinite perfection is not that of a mere negation of finitude but also an eminent affirmation of all pure perfections. The human mind is able to conceive these perfections and to affirm them of God, apart from the finite modes in which they are embodied in our experience and thought. This activity of predication by way of eminence and analogical affirmation, along with a denial of limitation, would account for the idea of God, without having recourse to innatism.” These are potent objections to Descartes’ argument concerning the provable existence of God as contained in his third meditation.
Having laid out objections to Descartes’ argument, the subsequent will develop responses to them that Descartes gives or is in a position to give. To begin with, with regard to the objection concerning the idea of an infinite God existing in the finite mind of Descartes, the philosopher (Descartes) insists that his idea of God “is a positive one, even though it is not comprehensive of God’s infinite perfection. It is (nonetheless) a clear and distinct idea, and hence can be used somewhat like the distinct ideas in mathematics, which are applied to the limit; just as geometry deals with the properties of the circle by superposition of a rectilinear polyhedron having an infinite number of sides, so our idea of infinite perfection can be used to know, but never to comprehend, the infinite God.” Notice in any case the emphasis placed on the word “comprehensive.” This response concerns the situation of a finite thinking thing, such as Descartes is, grappling with the idea of God, an infinitely perfect being.
With regard to the second objection, concerning efficient causality, “Descartes never argued from an order of efficient causes operating in the sensible world. He had to start from immaterial entities, since the existence of sensible things was still under doubt. Moreover, his starting point was the self only as a thinking thing and, indeed only as having the idea of the infinite. Finally, he disagreed with the remark of Thomas that nothing can be its own efficient cause. He juggled a good deal with the terms ‘efficient cause’ and ‘cause of itself,’ and for Descartes it was enough to have a distinct and certain idea, in order to draw an existential conclusion. One reason why Descartes characterized God as “cause of itself” was to lend force to the a priori truth of the proposition ‘God exists’ as it follows from our idea of God.” And with regard to innatism, Descartes avers that God, responsible as he is for our idea of him, accounts for the dependence on him of this idea. In other words, our having divine knowledge of God “depends on God’s eternal will and affirmation of his own existence,” and since such knowledge cannot be factitious or adventitious, the ideas that compose it must be innate.
Descartes, in my opinion, does make a fairly successful argument. The reason I state thus is because I realize that he answers his opponents’ objections credibly, and his appeal to the principle of efficient causality is pertinent to such answer. Besides, his arguments follow a plausibly logical process.
Having laid out objections to Descartes’ argument, the subsequent will develop responses to them that Descartes gives or is in a position to give. To begin with, with regard to the objection concerning the idea of an infinite God existing in the finite mind of Descartes, the philosopher (Descartes) insists that his idea of God “is a positive one, even though it is not comprehensive of God’s infinite perfection. It is (nonetheless) a clear and distinct idea, and hence can be used somewhat like the distinct ideas in mathematics, which are applied to the limit; just as geometry deals with the properties of the circle by superposition of a rectilinear polyhedron having an infinite number of sides, so our idea of infinite perfection can be used to know, but never to comprehend, the infinite God.” Notice in any case the emphasis placed on the word “comprehensive.” This response concerns the situation of a finite thinking thing, such as Descartes is, grappling with the idea of God, an infinitely perfect being.
With regard to the second objection, concerning efficient causality, “Descartes never argued from an order of efficient causes operating in the sensible world. He had to start from immaterial entities, since the existence of sensible things was still under doubt. Moreover, his starting point was the self only as a thinking thing and, indeed only as having the idea of the infinite. Finally, he disagreed with the remark of Thomas that nothing can be its own efficient cause. He juggled a good deal with the terms ‘efficient cause’ and ‘cause of itself,’ and for Descartes it was enough to have a distinct and certain idea, in order to draw an existential conclusion. One reason why Descartes characterized God as “cause of itself” was to lend force to the a priori truth of the proposition ‘God exists’ as it follows from our idea of God.” And with regard to innatism, Descartes avers that God, responsible as he is for our idea of him, accounts for the dependence on him of this idea. In other words, our having divine knowledge of God “depends on God’s eternal will and affirmation of his own existence,” and since such knowledge cannot be factitious or adventitious, the ideas that compose it must be innate.
Descartes, in my opinion, does make a fairly successful argument. The reason I state thus is because I realize that he answers his opponents’ objections credibly, and his appeal to the principle of efficient causality is pertinent to such answer. Besides, his arguments follow a plausibly logical process.
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